Dispatches: After Caracas: Is U.S. Primacy Being Reasserted or Redefined?
Key Notes
Venezuela is a systemic test case. The operation in Venezuela is less about domestic regime change and more about whether the United States can still act unilaterally without triggering retaliation. The response—or lack thereof—will signal whether United States primacy remains uncontested.
The global order hinges on reactions, not the operation itself. The behavior of China, Russia, and other players will determine whether this moment consolidates United States hegemony or accelerates a shift toward competing spheres of influence.
Taiwan and Ukraine are the real indicators. Any adjustment in the United States posture toward Taiwan or its commitment to Ukraine and NATO will clarify whether Washington is maintaining global pressure or selectively retrenching to its backyard.
Development
On January 3, 2026, a United States operation captured and extradited Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro. The operation followed months of military activity conducted under the stated objective of combating narcotrafficking originating in Venezuela and destined for the United States. It also reflected a longer-standing confrontation between Washington, D.C., and the Chavista regime in Caracas.
Since the early 2000s, Venezuela, under the leadership of Hugo Chávez and later Nicolas Maduro, positioned itself as an opposing force to United States foreign policy in Latin America and, more broadly, at the global level. The U.S. responded with successive rounds of severe sanctions, while Venezuela aligned itself with major powers such as Russia and China. This alignment elevated Caracas into a relevant partner within a group of states seeking to challenge the current American-led international order. The anti-Western narrative promoted in Caracas closely echoed those advanced by Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, Tehran, and Havana.
With Maduro now in captivity, this group of states is left without a key component. The regime change in Venezuela is not primarily about who governs Caracas, but about a broader strategic question: does the United States retain an unchallenged monopoly on the use of force, and thus its position as global hegemon, or is Washington withdrawing into its historical sphere of influence in Latin America, allowing rival powers to consolidate their own spheres of influence within an emerging multipolar order?
Analysis
When referring to the United States’ monopoly on the use of force, two core elements are implied. First, the ability of the United States to employ force at the international level while remaining effectively unopposed, as no other state is willing to engage in direct military confrontation. Second, the inability of other states to use force to settle disputes without United States consent or intervention.
The United States demonstrated its monopoly on the use of force internationally on multiple occasions after emerging victorious from the Cold War. This was first evident during the NATO-led intervention in the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, and later during the post-9/11 “war on terror,” including the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which dismantled the Taliban regime, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which deposed Saddam Hussein.
These interventions were heavily criticized and widely condemned. Yet the United States’ status as the sole superpower ensured two outcomes: its actions were not meaningfully sanctioned, and no other state dared to employ force as an instrument of diplomacy without United States consent. At this stage, Washington’s monopoly on the use of force remained intact.
The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya marked a turning point. The deposition of Muammar Gaddafi demonstrated the full extent of United States-led hegemonic power, but it also served as a strategic warning to non-aligned states. The intervention signaled that regime survival could no longer be assumed, even in the absence of direct confrontation with Washington.
In the aftermath of Libya, Russia and China adjusted their strategic postures. Russian and Chinese leaderships adopted increasingly confrontational approaches toward the United States-led order. As China rose as an economic competitor and began challenging the United States primacy in the security domain, questions emerged over whether the international system was shifting toward a bipolar or multipolar configuration.
Following Libya, Russia intervened militarily in Syria to preserve the Assad regime, annexed Crimea in 2014, supported separatist activity in Donbas, and ultimately launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These actions reflected a growing willingness among rival powers to use force without United States authorization. As a result, the weakening of the United States’ monopoly on the use of force has revived the question of spheres of influence.
Forecast
Recent events in Venezuela place the international system at a critical juncture. The manner in which events unfold over the coming weeks and years will determine the broader significance of the operation in Venezuela. These events may either reaffirm United States hegemony and its status as the sole superpower, if the operation is accepted as a fait accompli and no meaningful retaliation or unilateral counteraction follows; or, these events may signal a strategic recoil, in which Washington consolidates Latin America as its historical sphere of influence while rival powers pursue their own ambitions elsewhere.
The international system absorbs the shock: most likely outcome.
Russian and Chinese responses remain largely diplomatic. This assessment is supported by Moscow’s muted response to the fall of the Assad regime, despite its strategic interests in Syria, as well as Russia’s continued military and economic entanglement in Ukraine and inability to unilaterally bring the conflict to an end. On the Chinese side, a meaningful response would most plausibly involve action related to Taiwan; to date, however, United States deterrence in the region remains credible.
A secondary, less likely scenario involves strategic overextension. Emboldened by the success of the Caracas operation, Washington could attempt to replicate its approach in Iran, where the Ayatollah regime is currently under pressure from domestic unrest.
From an economic perspective, the United States is expected to gain greater leverage over Venezuelan oil production, a development that could place pressure on Chinese supply chains if energy exports are weaponized. Should Iran experience destabilization as well, disruptions to its oil exports to China could amplify economic stress and push Beijing closer into strategic alignment with Moscow.
Deliberate United States retrenchment: alternative trajectory, less likely.
Washington would tacitly accept the emergence of rival spheres of influence by reducing its global commitments.
A shift in posture toward Taiwan, such as a reduction in military presence or political support—particularly following China’s large-scale naval exercises around the island in late December 2025—could signal disengagement and an implicit reprioritization. In such a case, Taiwan may be de-emphasized in favor of consolidating influence in the Western Hemisphere.
A similar pattern could emerge in Ukraine. A further decline in United States military assistance and diplomatic engagement, potentially extending to a weakening of NATO cohesion, would create conditions for Russian advances in Eastern Europe as European states struggle to reorganize within a diminished security architecture.
What to monitor over the coming months
Venezuela: The evolution of the transition phase over the next month and the durability of the regime change. A successful consolidation could encourage Washington to replicate the approach elsewhere, while a contested transition may alarm other states about a renewed phase of United States hegemonic assertiveness.
Iran: The trajectory of domestic unrest and Washington’s positioning. This will serve as an early indicator of whether the United States is asserting its hegemony or signaling strategic restraint.
Taiwan: Any change in United States policy, military presence, or security commitments in the Pacific. Shifts in posture would indicate whether Washington is recognizing a Chinese sphere of influence or maintaining global pressure.
Europe: Changes in United States commitment to Ukraine and NATO. A reduction in engagement would suggest growing acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence, while sustained support would signal continued resistance to regional revisionism.
