Navigating U.S. Engagement in Central Asia - Part II

Key Notes

•   Russia’s dominance is eroding: While still the primary security guarantor, Moscow’s influence is weakened by the Ukraine war, economic strain, and shifting regional allegiances.

•   China’s economic surge faces limits: The Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Beijing’s reach, but concerns over sovereignty, debt, and transparency temper its acceptance.

•  US influence hinges on credibility and consistency: Post-Afghanistan, Washington must demonstrate sustained commitment through economic partnerships, cultural diplomacy, and cooperative security initiatives without forcing Central Asian states into binary choices. 

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving geopolitical contest in Central Asia, analyzing the shifting influence of Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States from the post–Cold War period through recent events. Russia’s longstanding security dominance, maintained through alliances like the CSTO, has been challenged by demographic shifts, internal political changes, and reputational damage following its invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has accelerated Beijing’s economic reach, as highlighted by the 2023 Xi’an Summit, though concerns over debt dependence and governance models persist. The United States, historically engaged through its Afghanistan operations, has faced a credibility gap since its 2021 withdrawal. It is now seeking to reassert influence through the C5+1 platform, targeted economic investment, private-sector engagement, and soft power initiatives. The study argues that Central Asian states will continue to pursue multivector strategies to balance ties among major powers, and that U.S. success will depend on long-term, consistent engagement that respects regional autonomy while leveraging comparative advantages in governance standards, education, and sustainable development.

Central Asia and the US

In the post–Cold War era, the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific have been immersed in a strategic military competition with China, a nation that has been modernizing its forces and augmenting its power projection capabilities. Up to this point, the United States has successfully dissuaded China from resorting to force to resolve sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait (Christensen, 2021). Additionally, the United States and its closest allies have imposed restrictions on the sale of weapons and attempted to limit the transfer of certain military technologies to China (Christensen, 2021).

Central Asia has gained geopolitical and geostrategic importance for the US, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In alignment with other Western governments, the Biden administration perceives Central Asia as a critical region for unlocking global trade routes that bypass Russia (EIU, 2023). Despite its strategic significance, relations between the US and the five Central Asian republics have remained limited. Several factors contribute to this, including the absence of a Central Asian lobby, the nature of linkages between the Stans and other great powers, and the onset of a new cold war between Russia and the West (Sullivan, 2019).

The importance of the Stans lies in their strategic location, sharing borders with principal adversaries like Russia, possessing substantial energy reserves, and influencing Afghanistan's future. Despite having diplomatic ties with all Central Asian republics and endorsing regional integration initiatives, the US faces limitations in fostering greater ties with the Stans (Sullivan, 2019). In the context of a preoccupied Russia and a reduced American influence in the region, countries within the area now possess more autonomy than in recent history (Murtazashvili, 2022). Consequently, a potential avenue for heightened US involvement in the region is leveraging relationships with Afghanistan and neighboring countries of China. These nations actively seek alternatives that enable them to strategically engage with major global powers and maintain a delicate balance in their relationships. 

Analysts at the Caspian Policy Center observe that the US has fallen far behind China's influence amid complex relationships between China and Central Asian countries (Imamova, 2023a). The US foreign policy strategy in Central Asia involves three main vectors: geopolitical, economic, and political-ideological/humanitarian. These vectors aim to establish diplomatic, economic, and ideological influence, with an apparent anti-Russian and anti-Chinese bias (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S581). Emphasizing multifaceted cooperation, the US views collaboration with Central Asian countries as crucial for the region's development and regional security, particularly in countering contemporary threats and challenges (Zholbaryssova, 2018, p. 241).

US in Central Asia before withdrawing from Afghanistan 

Historically, the geopolitical direction of US foreign policy has been closely tied to military actions in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Central Asian countries have been primarily viewed as a "gateway" to Afghanistan since the initiation of this operation (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022). For almost two decades, US engagement in the region has centered on supporting Washington's objectives in Afghanistan. However, the US has encountered significant challenges and lost substantial credibility in Central and South Asia after its twenty-year engagement in Afghanistan. The messy withdrawal captured the public imagination, revealing weaknesses in the US military and civilian agencies' ability to deliver on promises (Helf, 2023; Murtazashvili, 2022).

Survey results from 2017 to 2019 revealed that the general perception of the United States in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan hovered around the 50s on a 100-point scale, while Turkmenistan scored 76 (Stoll, 2023). This public opinion lagged behind Russia and China in all countries, and it is noteworthy that this data was collected before Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Stoll, 2023). US analysts propose a shift in the US strategy in the Central Asian region due to growing anti-American sentiments. This adjustment is considered one of the reasons for revising American public diplomacy towards Central Asia (Zholbaryssova, 2018). An influential instrument of US influence on Central Asian countries is the political format C5 + 1 (CA5 + USA), established by Washington in 2015. This framework involves regular meetings between the foreign ministers of the Central Asian countries and the US Secretary of State (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022).

The United States has responded to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and the Caucasus with a measured, if not implicitly supportive, approach. This approach is grounded in two main reasons: the reopening of historic east-west trade corridors, a significant legacy of the USSR's collapse, and the perception that the engagement of both China and Europe in east-west trade across Central Asia fosters balanced and positive relations between major powers (Starr, 2019).

US' Power Play within Central Asia

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the general perception of the United States in Central Asia is that it is a transient and opportunistic foreign power (Stoll, 2023). Despite withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in 2021, the United States seeks to rebuild its influence in Central Asia (Nikkei Staff Writers, 2023). As Central Asia's ties with Russia strain and concerns about Chinese influence rise, there exists an opportunity for the United States to bolster its reputation by committing to substantial, enduring investments in the region (Stoll, 2023). 

China's increased engagement in Central Asia carries implications for the United States as it exports its governance style, security ideology, and surveillance practices. While the US cannot match China's scale of investment directly, the challenge is evident, given Xi's recent offer of $3.6 billion in new development aid during the Xian summit, compared to the US Secretary of State Blinken's pledge of $25 million to support economic growth during his visit in March (Freeman & McFarland, 2023). 

The United States should actively contribute to finding clearly defined security solutions in Central Asian countries. Simultaneously, collaboration with the EU, South Korea, and Japan can enhance opportunities for Central Asia to engage with the democratic world (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). An area where the United States can offer greater assistance is in counterterrorism. While deploying large numbers of US forces could antagonize Russia or China, the State Partnership Program, fostering relationships between National Guard units and Central Asian countries, presents an avenue for minimizing force presence while maximizing benefits (Stoll, 2023).

Central Asian republics, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Armenia, know that the West, including the US and NATO, will not go to war against Russia. They understand that Russia will come to their defense if faced with a military attack from foreign adversaries, emphasizing the importance of Russia's role in their security (Sullivan, 2019). Washington acknowledges that the revival of the military industry within the CSTO increases member states' independence. The US is considering involving CSTO member states in the arms industry, possibly initially free of charge, as part of its strategic approach (Strakhova, 2023).

US' Economic Relationship with Central Asia 

The United States needs a deliberate and focused approach, considering it is unlikely to outspend China or Russia, focusing on areas with the greatest return on investment (Stoll, 2023). Central Asian ambassadors to Washington express eagerness to collaborate on issues the US has long advocated for, including water and energy sustainability, security cooperation, environmental protection, climate, and connectivity (Imamova, 2023). The US has significantly promoted dialogue and cooperation among Central Asian nations through initiatives such as the C5+1, a diplomatic platform comprising Washington and the region's five governments (Imamova, 2023).

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is potentially strengthening China's ability to check Russia's neo-imperial aspirations in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Starr, 2019, p. 85). While acknowledging China's economic and infrastructural dominance, the US emphasizes broader relationships in Central Asia, aiming for a more diversified engagement (Caspian Policy Center, 2023). China's Belt and Road Initiative raises US concerns about economic dependence and unsustainable infrastructure projects in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Imamova, 2023a).

The US Department of State announced an additional $25 million in funding for the 'Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative,' which aims to enhance President Biden's approach to the region, emphasizing regional connectivity and private-sector investment (Nelson, 2023). However, the looming obstacle is China (Nelson, 2023). While the US may not match China's financial investment, Washington has a window of opportunity to catalyze increasing private sector investment, leveraging China's global reputation challenges (Nelson, 2023).

Geography may limit the US compared to Russia and China, but developing the Middle Corridor trade route and fostering Central Asia as a global IT hub could open the region to Western markets (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). Western capital and expertise play a significant role in diversifying investment, fostering economic growth, and reducing reliance on powerful neighbors (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). The US government should support American investment in the region, demonstrating reliability as a peaceful partner and offering an alternative to China and Russia in Central Asia (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023).

Supporting Central Asian efforts to connect to the outside world through the "middle corridor" and leveraging soft power through educational scholarships and civil society support can offer a third alternative to balance China and Russia (Freeman & McFarland, 2023). Given the region's proximity to countries facing international sanctions, it becomes crucial to endorse heightened economic integration and connectivity through the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Turkey. Additionally, advocating for sanctions relief wherever feasible is imperative (Helf, 2023).

US Implications

Making proactive economic and cultural investments in the next generations of Central Asia could generate positive outcomes for the United States, lasting for decades (Stoll, 2023). Rebuilding its reputation in Central Asia demands a tailored approach from the United States that considers the specific needs of each country in the region. The potential avenues to explore include economic investment, private-sector engagement, language immersion programs, and support for counterterrorism missions (Stoll, 2023). The USA has worked to prevent any outside power, or combination of outside powers, from dominating Central Asia (Starr, 2019, p. 82). 

Focusing solely on competing with China should not be the core aspect of the US strategy in Central Asia (Imamova, 2023a). Acknowledging that the United States cannot surpass the influence of the region's major neighboring powers is crucial. Still, it can emphasize US comparative advantages regarding international standards that bring greater long-term benefits. Russia's diminishing reputation and China's diminishing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have set the stage for a reenvisioned relationship with these essential partners (Nelson, 2023). Considering neighboring influences like China and Russia and the skepticism toward secure democratic systems, there is a reluctance to emulate countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, or Pakistan (Imamova, 2023b). 

Despite shared economic interests among the five republics, the region still needs more cohesion (Asiryan, 2021, p. 79). Central Asian regionalism consists of several competing and overlapping regional projects (Asiryan, 2021, p. 80). All five Central Asian republics drastically differ from European countries in their political, economic, and social makeup. The non-democratic nature of Central Asian states presents a challenge to the European integration theory. Regional integration projects in Europe and Central Asia are different and require different approaches to analyzing them (Asiryan, 2021, p. 80). Central Asian states turn towards regionalism internally to achieve security and economic leverage over more powerful states involved in the region (Asiryan, 2021, p. 80).

The US strategy in Central Asia aims to "support and strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian States, individually and as a region," which should be carried out "with consistent US engagement on economic, energy, security, democracy, and governance issues" of the Central Asian states (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S582). As follows from this document, the United States seeks to increase its influence in Central Asia under the pretext of helping to "reduce terrorist threats" for the countries of this region (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S582). The C5+1's second goal should facilitate greater collaboration among the Central Asian states, fostering a cohesive regional bloc. Internal conflicts and competition between these states weaken them collectively and create opportunities for external powers to exploit their divisions (Helf, 2023). 

Conclusion

The Central Asian states view their security as maintaining extensive contacts with various influential external actors, encompassing China and Russia, the United States, the European Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, and India (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). It is essential to respect the multivector foreign policy adopted by the Central Asian states. Living as neighbors with Russia, China, and other immediate neighbors, they have limited influence in altering the region's geopolitics and geography. Pressuring them to make choices would be a mistake (Helf, 2023).

Furthermore, Central Asia's security strategy involves maintaining extensive contacts with influential external actors, emphasizing a multivector approach that includes engagement with the United States, China, Russia, the European Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, and India. Respecting the autonomy of Central Asian states and acknowledging their limited influence in altering regional geopolitics is crucial, as attempting to force choices may prove counterproductive. 

Recent developments, such as Russia's actions in Ukraine, have brought geopolitical tensions to the forefront, impacting the calculus of Central Asian states. Concurrently, China's economic outreach, notably through the BRI, raises concerns about economic dependence and sustainable development. Against this backdrop, while recognizing it may not match China's financial investments, the US can catalyze private sector engagement, leveraging its comparative advantages. In essence, the changing geopolitical landscape in Central Asia necessitates a nuanced understanding of the shifting perceptions and strategic priorities of the United States. Acknowledging the intricate dynamics of the region and implementing a strategy aligned with its evolving nature, the United States can actively contribute to shaping the future of Central Asia.

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