Navigating U.S. Engagement in Central Asia - Part I

Key Notes

•   Russia’s dominance is eroding: While still the primary security guarantor, Moscow’s influence is weakened by the Ukraine war, economic strain, and shifting regional allegiances.

•   China’s economic surge faces limits: The Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Beijing’s reach, but concerns over sovereignty, debt, and transparency temper its acceptance.

•  US influence hinges on credibility and consistency: Post-Afghanistan, Washington must demonstrate sustained commitment through economic partnerships, cultural diplomacy, and cooperative security initiatives without forcing Central Asian states into binary choices. 

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving geopolitical contest in Central Asia, analyzing the shifting influence of Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States from the post–Cold War period through recent events. Russia’s longstanding security dominance, maintained through alliances like the CSTO, has been challenged by demographic shifts, internal political changes, and reputational damage following its invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has accelerated Beijing’s economic reach, as highlighted by the 2023 Xi’an Summit, though concerns over debt dependence and governance models persist. The United States, historically engaged through its Afghanistan operations, has faced a credibility gap since its 2021 withdrawal. It is now seeking to reassert influence through the C5+1 platform, targeted economic investment, private-sector engagement, and soft power initiatives. The study argues that Central Asian states will continue to pursue multivector strategies to balance ties among major powers, and that U.S. success will depend on long-term, consistent engagement that respects regional autonomy while leveraging comparative advantages in governance standards, education, and sustainable development.

Introduction 

Exploring China's growing influence in security and economy, along with Russia's geopolitical strategies, prompts an investigation into the broader dynamics of Central Asia. This inquiry is framed by the question: 'How has the US perception of Central Asia shifted since the Fall of the Cold War and the rise of Chinese power and Putin's Russia?' Notable events, including Russia's involvement in Ukraine, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the recent US engagements in Afghanistan, collectively weave a narrative of changing geopolitical interactions that shape the evolving role and perception of the US in Central Asia. 

The US perception of Central Asia has evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War, particularly in response to the rise of Chinese power and the assertiveness of Putin's Russia. In recent years, the region has gained strategic importance for the United States due to various factors, including concerns about China's expanding influence, Russia's actions in Ukraine, and the potential for increased volatility. The US has engaged with Central Asian countries through diplomatic initiatives like the C5+1, emphasizing economic cooperation, security collaboration, and democratic values. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised apprehensions, and the US aims to offer alternative partnerships based on international standards. Despite challenges, the US recognizes the need for a multivector approach in Central Asia, respecting the region's complex geopolitical landscape. Central Asian states, balancing relations with major powers, seek security through diverse external engagements. The US should focus on deliberate and focused strategies, emphasizing soft power, economic investment, and long-term cultural engagement to rebuild its image in the region. Despite competitive challenges, the US aims to leverage its comparative advantages, including adherence to international standards. The evolving dynamics underscore the importance of understanding Central Asia's geopolitical shifts and the delicate balance required in engaging with major regional players.

Background 

Central Asia lies between Russia, Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Middle East. The multifaceted linkages of these hegemons further offset US and Western influence (Sullivan, 2019). As European interest in Central Asia grows, China is simultaneously deepening its strategic footprint in the region. This strategy aims to strengthen China's geopolitical standing concerning Europe and promote stability along the most direct route of the Belt and Road Initiative (Kaya, 2023). China's support for Central Asia also appears to counter US accusations of its coercive diplomacy (Hayley, 2023).

Central Asia is rich in oil, natural gas, and other resources such as uranium and rare metals. It has the potential to play a vital role in international trade amid hopes for the revival of the ancient Silk Road (Nikkei Staff Writers, 2023). Since their independence, all five republics have sought to alleviate economic, political, and cultural dependency on stronger powers and avoid isolation. US allies are also involved in detaching Central Asia from Russia and China. That is the goal, albeit in a soft and politically correct form, of the EU's new Central Asian policy (Kozhokin, 2023).

Amid Russia's war in Ukraine, Moscow faces limitations in offering the same degree of security cooperation to Central Asia, raising concerns in the region about Russia's claims to the region. China is increasing its involvement in a region traditionally under Moscow's influence. Additionally, with the United States reducing its presence in the area after withdrawing from Afghanistan, Beijing has the opportunity and motivation to expand its regional influence (Freeman & McFarland, 2023). Central Asian states seek to avoid taking sides in great power competition. They prefer "multivector" foreign policies that foster positive relations with Russia, China, the West, and other neighboring nations (Kozhokin, 2023).

Nevertheless, achieving a more balanced distribution of these "vectors" is essential. Throughout the past century, Russia has predominantly controlled security and economic ties with the former Soviet Republics (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S581). With Russia preoccupied with Ukraine and China gaining geopolitical prominence, the United States finds itself with significantly reduced influence, particularly after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. China has appeared reluctant to fill the vacuum of excellent power influence in Central Asia (Freeman & McFarland, 2023).

Central Asian foreign policy has long been molded by substantial Russian influence. However, the expanding presence of China in the region prompts a strategic shift for the United States, reframing its approach in light of heightened competition with Beijing (Imamova, 2023a). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States pledged a partnership during the pivotal early stage of the region's independence. Nevertheless, U.S.-Central Asian relations took a divergent path as China and Russia emerged as the dominant economic powers in the region (Nelson, 2023). To reduce reliance on Russia, Central Asian states have collaborated with China for nearly two decades to construct oil and gas pipelines (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). This strategic partnership aims to mitigate the risk of falling under a Kremlin stranglehold on their hydrocarbon exports. The collaboration between Central Asia and China was relatively unproblematic in the initial decade of the century, marked by China's foreign policy under the banner of a "peaceful rise." However, it has become more challenging in recent years, coinciding with Chinese leader Xi Jinping adopting a more assertive "wolf warrior" diplomacy approach (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023). Central Asia's main competitors are traditionally considered the three world powers: China, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. Each of the three states is interested in consolidating its presence in the region and reducing competitors' level of influence (Zholbaryssova, 2018, p. 234). Central Asia's relationships with each of those countries influence how US foreign policy has shifted to respond to changes in attitudes in the region. 

Central Asia and Russia

Since the Central Asian states were a part of the USSR, their economy had been shattered, they are landlocked (Khetran, 2016, p. 66). Central Asia and Afghanistan's landlocked countries depend on their neighbors. They would benefit considerably from growing connections (Khetran, 2016, p. 67). Russia ensures not only its sovereignty and independence but also the sovereignty and independence of its allies. This makes Central Asia a unique region. Three of the five states in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Article 4 of which states: "If one of the Member States faces aggression (an armed attack threatening security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States as aggression ... against all Member States of this Treaty" (CSTO, 2021). Suppose a Member State encounters an act of aggression characterized by an armed attack jeopardizing security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. In that case, all other Member States will expeditiously furnish the affected state with necessary military assistance. Moreover, they will extend support through available means, per the right to collective defense stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, upon the requesting Member State's plea (Kozhokin, 2023). 

Does Central Asia depend on Russia? Yes, but this dependence is of an exceptional kind. The stability of local countries and the effects of their multivector policy depend on Russia's successful development and its military and economic might. When Russia is influential, it has leeway and freedom of maneuver in international relations. A weakening of Russia is fraught with the destabilization of the Central Asian Five (Kozhokin, 2023). Central Asia is an area of vital strategic interest for Russia, including our country's most important national security interests. This continues to set the task of the most active opposition to Central Asia's US foreign policy strategy (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S587). The Central Asian states have also gone their respective ways in their relations with Russia. However, none have conducted policies that could be considered "anti-Russian" (a term often used by Moscow). However, the ripples caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine have profoundly reshaped the dynamics between Moscow and Central Asian countries (Engvall, 2023, p. 261).

Russia continues to wield influence over the Central Asian heads of state and political elite, many of whom are remnants of the Soviet era. However, these aging politicians' sway and ties to Russia gradually diminish. With over half of the region's population under 30, born after the dissolution of the USSR, they exhibit much more relaxed political and cultural connections to Russia (Stoll, 2023). Public opinion surveys further highlight the diminishing influence of Russia. Numerous respondents voiced apprehension about the Ukraine conflict's repercussions on their nations, particularly within their economic domains (Stoll, 2023). Russia has diminished significantly since the dissolution of the USSR but maintains dominance in Central Asia across cultural, linguistic, political, economic, and military aspects. China can further sideline the US as a regional player in building its connections. (Sullivan, 2019). The Kremlin traditionally viewed the area as its strategic backyard but has been displaced by China as the premier economic force for the region's five countries. Moscow's war in Ukraine has released geopolitical and economic shock waves and seen China's role in the region grow through diplomatic summits and new initiatives that have disrupted the tightrope that Central Asian governments have walked to balance their ties between China, Russia, and the West (Standish, 2023).

Since the 1990s, Central Asian states have witnessed Russia's invasion of former Soviet Republics and support of separatist movements numerous times (Stoll, 2023). However, since the Ukraine war, Russia's influence in its former Soviet sphere has begun to wane. Kazakhstan is the most willing to diverge from Russia. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while seeking CSTO assistance during violent protests in January 2022, has openly challenged Russian President Vladimir Putin multiple times since Russia invaded Ukraine. Tokayev emphasizes the importance of maintaining a positive relationship between the two countries but has clarified that Kazakhstan will not violate Western sanctions to support Russia (Stoll, 2023). Kazakhstan adopts a nuanced foreign policy approach, where actions or statements not aligning with Russia should not be automatically perceived as pro-U.S. or pro-China but rather as pro-Kazakhstan. President Tokayev, prioritizing Kazakhstan's agency and independent decision-making in political matters, like other Central Asian leaders, has emphasized that his country will not be exclusively subject to the influence of any significant power (Stoll, 2023). Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asian nation of 19 million people has served as the Kremlin's most reliable friend and ally (Hedlund, 2023). That is no longer the case. President Tokayev has emphasized that, although he will not align with Western sanctions on Russia, he unequivocally opposes any Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory. This stance enjoys widespread support among the Kazakh population (Hedlund, 2023).

Russia maintains diverse diplomatic ties in Central Asia, including bilateral connections with individual countries. In the geopolitical sphere, Russia engages through formats such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), expanding to include Uzbekistan. A notable instance of Russia's influence was evident in the successful CSTO peacekeeping operation at the request of Kazakhstan's leadership in January 2022 (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S581). The post-Soviet CSTO is fracturing, emphasizing the Kremlin's weakening hold on its neighbors (Temnycky, 2023). The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is becoming more active amid growing instability in the wider Eurasian region (Strakhova, 2023). Military and economic cooperation within the CSTO is an essential integration component since it implies equipping the armed forces with the latest weapons, developing military engineering in all CSTO states, and maintaining common arms standards (Strakhova, 2023). To prevent the development of military-economic and military-technical cooperation within the CSTO, the United States has initiated a discussion that Russia will, at some point, be unable to supply Central Asian countries with ammunition and weapons for border protection because of the ASW (Strakhova, 2023). The revival of the former Soviet-era cooperation between the defense establishments of the CSTO countries, which the Secretary-General recently updated, may be aimed at creating a resource base for this autonomous security system in the region (Strakhova, 2023). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the CSTO. Militarily nonaligned Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prohibit foreign military bases on their territories, but they maintain extensive connections with Russia's armed forces and intelligence services through weapons purchases and joint education (Engvall, 2023, p. 262). Russia's annexation of Crimea sent a clear message of what would likely happen if Kazakhstan were to try to break away from Russian influence, including its membership in Moscow-led organizations such as the CSTO and the EAEU (Engvall, 2023, p. 262).

Understanding the nuanced specifics of each Central Asian country is crucial, considering factors like traditions, culture (including the role of Islam), political systems, and their involvement in organizations such as the CSTO, CIS, EAEU, and SCO (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S587). The focus should extend to the activities of both government and non-government Russian entities, particularly in political, ideological, and humanitarian domains. This attention becomes even more imperative in the context of the intense information war waged against Russia by the United States and its allies in Central Asia (Kokoshin & Kokoshina, 2022, S587). 

Russia and China's Relationship 

Russia remains a presence in Central Asia despite being viewed as toxic by society. It continues to be a preferred partner for legal migration, language, academia, and even government in Kazakhstan. However, the region acknowledges the risks associated with China's investments, such as hidden debt, environmental impact, lack of transparency, and data security concerns. While Russia's influence is enduring, China's growing economic involvement comes with potential benefits and risks (Caspian Policy Center, 2023).

Long assumed separation of roles - Russia providing security and China delivering investment and business development - the dynamics between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia are shifting. Russia's armed intervention in Kazakhstan in early 2022 may mark its last significant stand in the region, with proposed joint drills canceled and doubts arising about Russia's future role in trade and development due to strain on its economy. The main question is how much Beijing will capitalize on Russia's diminishing influence (Hedlund, 2023a). It seems clear that Central Asian states would prefer China's economic and peaceful development as a model to Russia's political and military coercion. However, this perspective represents just one side of Central Asia's sentiments (Standish, 2023). Central Asian countries closely observe the ties between China and Russia with complex feelings. While a closer China-Russia partnership in non-economic areas may not be welcomed, China's economic blueprint for Central Asia, including Russia, is attractive. The United States is also monitoring these developments (Standish, 2023).

Russia's war in Ukraine has limited Moscow's ability to fulfill its longstanding role as a guarantor of domestic stability in Central Asia. Amid discussions on economic and trade issues, China intends to help Central Asia enhance its law enforcement and security capabilities. This aligns with Beijing's intensifying campaign for "global security," signaling a potential expansion of China's influence in the region as Russia's role undergoes challenges (Freeman & McFarland, 2023).

Central Asia's Economic Relationship with China

In Asia, two contrasting aspects, "Economic Asia" and "Security Asia," coexist. Economic Asia portrays a dynamic, integrated region with substantial intra-regional trade and a thriving $19 trillion economy. On the flip side, Security Asia is marked by mistrustful powers, nationalism, territorial disputes, and military posturing, creating a collision between economic and security interests (Feigenbaum, 2012). While Asian economies increasingly depend on each other and China for trade and investment, the security landscape is characterized by nationalist tensions, naval buildups, and a shift towards the United States for security, challenging the notion of parallel economic and security trajectories (Feigenbaum, 2012).

Central Asia has witnessed substantial investments from China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the last ten years. While governments in the region have welcomed Chinese investment, public opinion in Central Asian countries reflects a degree of skepticism, influenced in part by historical considerations. Surveys conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan reveal a declining trend in public sentiment towards China (Stoll, 2023). The Central Asian governments, facing limited alternatives after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia's actions in Ukraine, engage in deals with China, though not without acknowledging flaws such as low regulation and potential crony capitalism (Stoll, 2023).

China's investment in Central Asia through the BRI involves funding numerous projects and offering economic growth opportunities. However, concerns about potential dependency, unsustainable lending practices, and debt accumulation in some Central Asian states have been raised. China's attractiveness lies in its strong and diversified economy, providing foreign direct investment, although economic benefits often return to China. Central Asia's strategic importance to China is further emphasized by its role as an alternative route for transporting commodities (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023; Hayley, 2023; Sharp, 2023).

While China has revitalized trade with Central Asia, concerns arise over issues such as debt-trap diplomacy, Chinese repression in Xinjiang affecting sentiment, and the potential development of dependency on Chinese investment. Despite some public anger toward Chinese businesses in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, other Central Asian states like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan show less clear anti-Chinese sentiment. China's long-term strategy and its influence through the BRI raise concerns among foreign investors about competition with Chinese financial capabilities such as debt distress (Hedlund, 2023a; Imamova, 2023c; Nelson, 2023).

Central Asia and China's Regional Cooperation 

In the realm of Security in Asia, the United States benefits by reinforcing its central role, acting as a crucial strategic balancer in the face of China's expanding power projection capabilities such as land ports. However, this victory comes at a cost, as a security-dominated Asia tends to be notably more volatile, a situation the US has sought to avoid for the past two decades (Feigenbaum, 2012). Navigating this landscape becomes increasingly challenging for the US, necessitating decisions on matters of principle, such as freedom of navigation and specific sovereignty claims. For instance, disputes like those in the South China Sea could potentially pull an American president into military conflicts over contested territories for which the United States has no direct claim (Feigenbaum, 2012).

As a crucial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) land corridor, Central Asia holds significant implications for major powers across the Eurasian landmass. The region's impact extends to shaping US policies in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe and influencing its complex relations with Moscow (Luft & Nye, 2017, p. 34). The role of China in Central Asia poses intricate challenges for the regional states, serving both as a valuable offset to Russia and a potential hegemonic threat. Over the years, Chinese intellectuals have asserted claims to various parts of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, adding complexity to the region's geopolitical dynamics (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023).

China's interest in Central Asia is rooted in security concerns related to its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The proximity of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to Xinjiang has led to intense scrutiny of ethnic Central Asians living in the region by Chinese authorities. Reports indicate the detention of ethnic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs in so-called re-education centers, contributing to growing resentment, particularly along the border (Stoll, 2023). To stabilize its vast western province, Xinjiang, China has prioritized relations with Central Asia. Beijing sees the region as a potential market, energy source, and other natural resources (Hill, 2002).

Additionally, it considers Central Asia a crucial communications bridge to Iran and the Middle East (Hill, 2002). A recent summit in Xi'an, China, witnessed leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping for the C+C5. During the summit, efforts were made to persuade Central Asian countries that they could rely on China in a polarized world, emphasizing a shared "common destiny" (Yao, 2023).

While Central Asian countries exhibit varying receptiveness to China's overtures, a region-wide trend indicates closer alignment with the powerful neighbor to the east. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, though historically more hesitant, are also moving towards increased engagement with Beijing (Yao, 2023). Despite the desire of Central Asian countries to prevent any single great power from dominating the region, the practical implementation of a "multivector" approach has proven challenging. Internal constraints, including being landlocked and sharing a long border with China, lead Central Asian leaders to argue for maintaining close relations with their giant neighbor (Yao, 2023). Chinese uniformed personnel are reported to be present in Tajikistan, indicating an invitation from the Tajik government for activities ranging from border security to counterterrorism (Imamova, 2023a). China's effectiveness in Central Asia varies, as observed in conflict and unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. China, at times, finds itself outside these events, lacking a comprehensive understanding and meaningful contributions to conflict resolution (Imamova, 2023a). In Kazakhstan, recent studies reveal that China is perceived as the least preferred partner, although engagement is anticipated, albeit reluctantly, leaving room for other opportunities (Imamova, 2023a). Concerns persist regarding China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang, which is a focal point of apprehension in Central Asia (Imamova, 2023a).

Xi'an Summit

China initiated its first Central Asia summit on May 18, with leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in attendance. The two-day event included one-on-one meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and group discussions. The primary goal was strengthening political and economic ties between China and its Central Asian neighbors. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev expressed a common goal to intensify bilateral relations (Sharp, 2023). President Xi likely initiated the C5+C Summit to enhance Chinese influence and raise the summit to an executive level, challenging the existing C5+1 forum. Despite Central Asian satisfaction with the C5+1, concerns were raised that the platform had not yielded significant benefits (Herbst & D'Anieri, 2023).

The summit aimed to secure greater partnerships while Beijing likely sought to reduce US dominance, address ethnic unrest in Xinjiang, and fill the void left by Russia amid its war in Ukraine. However, concerns were raised by Central Asian Muslims criticizing China's treatment of Uyghurs, and leaders expressed wariness about Xi's close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin (Sharp, 2023).

In response to the summit, Central Asian leaders, including Presidents Tokayev, Japarov, Rahmon, Mirziyoyev, and Berdimuhamedov, visited Xi'an, emphasizing the historical and strategic significance of the Belt and Road Initiative (Kaya, 2023). Discussions covered mutual trade, economic cooperation, security, friendship, hydropower projects, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway (Kaya, 2023).

Following the summit, leaders signed the Xi'an Declaration, outlining plans for future China-Central Asia relations. They expressed commitment to sovereignty, independence, security, and territorial integrity, rejecting external interference. The agreement highlighted trade liberalization, industrial cooperation, development corridors, the "Cultural Silk Road," scholarships, and joint efforts against threats (Kaya, 2023).

Europe's Relationship with Central Asia

Amid Russia's diminishing influence, the US and Europe intensified their diplomatic engagements with Central Asian countries, aiming to counterbalance Russia's sphere of influence. The post-Ukraine invasion geopolitical landscape has led to increased summits with Central Asian leaders, reflecting the heightened battle for influence (Nikkei Staff Writers, 2023). In tandem, the European Union (EU) seeks to strengthen its ties with Kazakhstan, accounting for a significant portion of the country's foreign direct investment and external trade. This engagement gains importance at a time when Russia's influence wanes due to geopolitical events such as the Ukraine conflict, prompting intensified diplomatic efforts by major global players in Central Asia (Nikkei Staff Writers, 2023).

EU involvement in Central Asia, particularly within the BRI framework, faces challenges due to inconsistencies in its general approach. The argument centers on the limited impact of EU engagement in the region, citing contradictions in dealing with Central Asia. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of EU participation in the BRI are recognized, countering economic over-reliance on China and contributing to long-term dialogue with the region (Asiryan, 2021, pp. 77-78). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could enhance Iran's role as a trade conduit connecting China, Central Asia, and Europe. Simultaneously, amid efforts to contain Iran, the US and its allies may view this development with concern. Additionally, Russia might perceive the BRI as an attempt to undermine its Eurasian trade, especially given its diminished influence following the Ukraine conflict and Western sanctions (Luft & Nye, 2017, p. 33).

The US foreign policy strategy in Central Asia is driven by a broader Eurasian strategy, aiming to preserve US dominance globally. Key components include regional consolidation, NATO inclusion of Georgia and Azerbaijan, withdrawal of Armenia from Russian influence, and initiatives like the BTC project. The strategy also involves pressure on Iran and an expanded military-political presence in Central Asia (Zholbaryssova, 2018, p. 234).

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