Country Risk Analysis: Lebanon after the 2024 Ceasefire

Period of Analysis: November 2024 to February 2025, Lebanon after the Ceasefire

Central Question: Can Lebanon reclaim full sovereignty and achieve lasting stability by dismantling Hezbollah’s parallel state structure, rebuilding national institutions, and navigating a narrow path of reform amid regional and international pressures?

Key Notes

•   Lebanon Faces a Historic Inflection Point

The November 2024 cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, followed by the fall of the Assad regime and the election of Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, has created a rare and unprecedented opportunity for Lebanon to reclaim its sovereignty. This moment offers a potential exit from decades of state capture, corruption, and geopolitical subservience—and demands swift action to consolidate state authority, rebuild institutions, and chart a new course.

•   Disarming Hezbollah is Essential to State Survival

The disarmament of Hezbollah is not merely a political goal—it is a geopolitical and legal necessity. Hezbollah's weakening presents a window for the Lebanese state to reclaim its monopoly on the use of force. Whether through democratic means or state-led action, full disarmament is a prerequisite for national recovery, the restoration of legal sovereignty, and protection from Iran’s destabilizing influence.

•   The Stakes Transcend Lebanon: A Test for Regional Order and Global Institutions

Lebanon’s trajectory will test whether fragile states can break free from external manipulation and militia rule through international cooperation, institutional reform, and economic reconstruction. Its recovery could serve as a model for conflict resolution across the Middle East—and a validation of the international liberal order’s capacity to deliver peace and stability in a multipolar world.

Dec 2024: A Historic Opportunity for Sovereignty: Lebanon’s Chance to Redefine Its Future

Key Notes

•   A Historic Opportunity for Lebanon: The November 2024 cessation of hostility between Hezbollah and Israel offers Lebanon a rare chance to reclaim sovereignty, disarm non-state actors, and rebuild its institutions after decades of manipulation and decay.

•   Breaking the Cycle of Corruption and Dependency: Addressing Hezbollah’s entrenched influence and systemic corruption is crucial to restoring Lebanon’s independence and reducing its vulnerability to external control.

•   Economic Reform as the Key to Stability: Lebanon’s recovery hinges on bold reforms, stabilizing its currency, rebuilding infrastructure, and unlocking natural resources, while ensuring international aid is protected from corruption.

The announcement of a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon on November 27, 2024, represents a pivotal moment for Lebanon to reclaim its sovereignty, rebuild its institutions, and redefine its role in the global community. This historic agreement emphasizes the disarmament of non-state actors and offers Lebanon a lifeline to overcome decades of institutional decay and external manipulation.

How did Lebanon get here?

The Road to Dominance:

Understanding how Lebanon reached this critical juncture requires retracing the steps that allowed Hezbollah to amass its power. The terrorist group’s rise was facilitated by a convergence of domestic and regional factors:

1.      Post-Civil War Reconstruction and Service Vacuum

Hezbollah capitalized on the absence of state services in its strongholds, providing social, medical, and educational services to cement loyalty. Mismanagement of reconstruction by successive governments exacerbated inequalities, creating fertile ground for Hezbollah to act as a state within a state.

2.      Political Stalemates

The presidential and governmental deadlocks of 2014-2016 paralyzed Lebanon’s institutions, weakening centralized authority. Hezbollah exploited this void, culminating in Michel Aoun’s presidency in 2016, which gave the group the political cover to expand its influence unchecked. As seen in 2019, following mass movements in Beirut, by shielding a corrupt political elite, Hezbollah secured the political coverage it needed and ensured Lebanon remained incapable of reforming.

3.      International Isolation

The role of Hezbollah in Lebanon's 2019 economic collapse is undeniable. By shielding the corrupt political elite, Hezbollah exacerbated systemic corruption, deterring foreign monetary aid, such as the CEDRE funding, and obstructing essential fiscal reforms. This entrenched dysfunction ultimately culminated in the economic collapse. On a military level, Hezbollah worked to limit foreign assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), ensuring the group retained a comparative advantage in military capabilities. This deliberate undermining of the LAF deprived it of the resources necessary to fulfill its national duty and maintained the justification of the movement’s unlawful arsenal.

By 2022, Hezbollah reached its peak. With no president, no functional government or parliament, Lebanon existed as a hollow state, perfectly suiting Hezbollah’s strategy of unchecked control under the guise of protecting Lebanon’s interests. The group allowed an illusion of normalcy under its oppressive regime but always retained the capability to revoke freedoms or assert dominance through its weapons.

The Narrative of Resistance

While Hezbollah claimed to champion the Palestinian cause to maintain and galvanize its popular base, it increasingly became clear that its true mission was advancing Iran’s regional hegemony. Initially, Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s as a militant resistance movement against Israeli occupation. However, after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, its real raison d’être was unmasked. Hezbollah was not a resistance movement but an extension of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the front line of this regime’s regional agenda.

The October 7 attacks forced the group into a precarious position: act on its rhetoric or face domestic backlash. Its tepid response exposed vulnerabilities, leading to strategic missteps, and an entanglement that led the group to defeat. The ceasefire agreement represents a turning point. By committing to the disarmament, Hezbollah loses it military wing and Lebanon has the chance to rebuild its institutions and restore sovereignty.

The Path Forward

Avoiding Past Mistakes

Hezbollah’s rise underscores the perils of unaddressed grievances and systemic neglect. If economic and social disparities persist, another vacuum will emerge, vulnerable to exploitation by new actors. A comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process is essential, not just for combatants but for the entire community that has lived under Hezbollah's influence for decades. Many Hezbollah fighters have spent their adult lives in this role, with some knowing no other identity or livelihood outside the group’s ideology. Even those not formally enlisted often exist within its ecosystem, reliant on its structures for income and social belonging.

Economic Recovery

For Lebanon reclaim its sovereignty and to achieve sustainable domestic and regional stability, it must rebuild a robust economy capable of delivering essential services and security to its citizens. A strong Lebanese state, grounded in economic stability, can foster a cohesive national identity that transcends sectarian divisions, reducing vulnerability to foreign influence and preventing the rise of groups like Hezbollah in the future. Economic recovery is a prerequisite for stability.

Years of systemic corruption and mismanagement have depleted Lebanon’s strategic reserves, devalued its currency, and led to skyrocketing unemployment, persistent budget deficits, and crippling public debt. The country also suffers from low productivity and a loss of consumer and investor confidence. To reverse this trajectory, Lebanon must adopt a comprehensive economic reform strategy centered on macroeconomic stability, institutional rebuilding, and investment in critical sectors:

1-     Monetary and Fiscal Reforms: Implement sound monetary policies to stabilize the currency, while restructuring public finances by reducing wasteful spending, eliminating corruption, and modernizing the tax system to increase revenue.

2-     Debt Renegotiation: Renegotiate public debt with creditors, ensuring new loans are linked to sustainable long-term reforms.

3-     Reviving the Banking Sector: Restore depositor trust by implementing transparent policies, capital controls, and rebuilding regulatory frameworks.

4-     New Borrowing for Reconstruction: Seek new borrowing tied to specific reform and reconstruction milestones to restore investor confidence and stabilize the market.

5-     Economic Diversification: Develop offshore natural gas resources to unlock revenue potential and support fiscal stability.

The international community must provide financial aid, technical expertise, and investment to restart Lebanon’s economy, but these resources must be deployed under strict oversight to prevent misuse by the country’s entrenched corrupt political class. Economic stability is key not only to strengthening Lebanon’s legitimacy and extending services across all communities but also to supporting regional stability. A prosperous Lebanon reduces the appeal of non-state actors and prevents the country from becoming a failed state or a battleground for proxy conflicts. Economic recovery is not just a national imperative but a regional necessity.

A Fragile but Promising Start

The ceasefire agreement tasks the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with responsibilities critical to restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty, including disarmament of Hezbollah and securing the Blue Line. If successful, this marks a significant step toward stability. However, failure could trigger IDF reengagement, exposing the fragile nature of the arrangement and the need for monitoring and reinforcement.

The timeline for implementation is plausible, but achieving its ambitious goals will require substantial Western and Arab support for the LAF. Lebanon now faces international scrutiny, with a clear mandate to reassert control over its territory, sovereignty, and decisions on war and peace. Political breakthroughs, including ending the presidential deadlock, are urgently needed to make progress.

This ceasefire is not a peace treaty but a step toward one. For Lebanon, it is a chance to reclaim its sovereignty and chart a new course. For Israel, a stable Lebanon offers security. The challenges ahead are immense, but with decisive action, robust international support, and national resolve, this agreement could mark the beginning of a transformative era. A committed and capable administration is needed to fight corruption, lead reconstruction, and restore trust in Lebanon’s economy and international standing. Whether Lebanon seizes this opportunity or allows it to slip away will define its future for generations to come.

Key Indicators to Monitor:

•   Hezbollah’s and Iran’s actions, focusing on measurable compliance with disarmament efforts.

•   Lebanon’s presidential elections and government formation.

•   International support the Lebanese Armed Forces and economy.

•   Public narratives in Lebanese media and the streets.

Jan 2025: Seizing the Moment: Lebanon’s Path Forward

Key Points

•   New Leadership: Joseph Aoun’s presidency and Nawaf Salam’s premiership mark a shift away from entrenched elites and Iranian influence. Their success depends on tackling corruption, strengthening institutions, and moving beyond personality-based governance.

•   Economic Recovery: The next 18 months are crucial for financial reforms. Inflows of reconstruction funds can inject foreign currency into Lebanon’s Central Bank, reinvigorate infrastructure, and help restore public trust in national institutions.

•   Hezbollah’s Defeat: Weakened, the terrorist movement is now more isolated geographically and politically, with its disarmament appearing imminent. The narrative moving forward must clearly distinguish Hezbollah’s ideological defeat from the broader Shia community, a vital step to safeguard national unity.

Since the Cessation of Hostilities agreement between the State of Israel and the Hezbollah terrorist organization in November 2024, significant developments have occurred. The rapid fall of the Assad regime in Syria dealt a major blow to the Iran-backed "axis of resistance" in the Middle East. The consequences for Lebanon include the end of Assad’s interference in Lebanese politics, the disruption of Hezbollah’s supply lines, and the potential return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. In fact, the weakened Hezbollah intended to rely on the Assad regime to facilitate the transit of weapons and funds from Iran. This support would have enabled the group to rebuild its arsenal, maintain its support base, and gradually undermine international agreements aimed at its disarmament. However, these plans are no longer feasible. The new authorities in Damascus have indicated a focus on domestic priorities and a move away from Iran. With the Lebanese Armed Forces gaining confidence and solidifying control over Beirut’s airport and South Lebanon, Hezbollah now finds itself geographically and politically isolated.

The New Administration

The Lebanese presidency remained vacant following the departure of former President Michel Aoun, widely viewed as aligned with Hezbollah. The identity and political orientation of Michel Aoun’s successor were pivotal to determining the country’s future trajectory. However, the prolonged vacancy itself underscored Lebanon’s trajectory toward state failure and its role as an outpost of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. However, the weakening of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria contributed to the eventual resolution of the presidential deadlock.

1-     The President

The country required a president who could transcend the entrenched corruption of the political elite and inspire trust both domestically and internationally. Such a figure would need to break with the legacy of Iranian influence, prioritize the rehabilitation of state institutions, and oversee the sensitive task of Hezbollah’s disarmament. This disarmament needs to be managed carefully to ensure that the political and military defeat of Hezbollah is not perceived as a marginalization of Lebanon’s Shia community but rather fosters national unity and sovereignty.

Joseph Aoun emerged as a fitting candidate, as his record of aptitude and patriotism was demonstrated during critical moments in Lebanon’s recent history. Notably, he defied orders from Hezbollah and its allies to suppress protesters during the 2019 uprising. Additionally, his leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion solidified his reputation as a trusted figure.

Under Joseph Aoun’s command, the Lebanese Armed Forces remained the sole functional institution in the country, benefitting from sustained U.S. support. The international community’s confidence in him was further evident when the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement relied heavily on his ability to execute its terms. Now, as president, Joseph Aoun has signaled his intention to continue along the same trajectory, leveraging his position to conduct both domestic and international mandates with the necessary political and military backing.

2-     The Prime Minister

The Lebanese Constitution, which enshrines a system of power-sharing, limits the president’s unilateral authority, placing significant executive power in the hands of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the selection of a Prime Minister became critical to advancing President Aoun’s vision and agenda. For this role, Lebanon required a figure with domestic and international credibility, a commitment to national interests, and independence from the corruption that has plagued the political elite.

Despite opposition from Hezbollah and its Amal allies, who sought to impose Najib Mikati as Prime Minister, potentially hindering the new administration, Nawaf Salam was ultimately selected to form a government. This decision marked a significant shift in Lebanon’s geopolitical landscape, as Hezbollah found itself increasingly sidelined, unable to contend with the changing dynamics. Its opposition benching underscores a new reality: Hezbollah is now positioned to bear accountability for its role in Lebanon’s recent economic collapse, destruction, and international isolation.

Therefore, the election of Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic and the appointment of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister signify a pivotal moment in Lebanon’s geopolitical transition. These developments highlight a shift toward restoring institutional integrity, rebuilding international trust, and charting a new course for the country’s future, away from Iran’s “axis of resistance” and terror.

Prospects for Governance and Reform

The new government will have less than 18 months to implement crucial reforms before the 2026 Legislative Elections. Its cabinet’s formation reflects the gravity of the situation, offering valuable insight into the feasibility of these efforts, ranging from combating corruption and curbing Hezbollah’s influence to revitalizing the economy, overseeing disarmament, and restoring Lebanon’s international standing.

1.      Rebuilding International Relations

The government must rebuild Lebanon’s international relationships with both Western and Arab states to secure much-needed funding. These funds will be critical for resetting the economy and reconstructing areas devastated by the recent conflict. With the backing of Western and Arab partners, Lebanon can overcome the diplomatic isolation once imposed by Hezbollah and reclaim its rightful standing within the international community.

2.      Economic Reforms

Comprehensive financial and monetary reforms will be necessary to stabilize the banking sector and facilitate economic recovery. Years of deregulation and ad hoc management have left Lebanon’s economy in dire need of structural reform. Reconstruction funds will inject much-needed foreign currency into Lebanon, bolstering the Central Bank’s reserves and enabling economic revitalization through the rebuilding of critical infrastructure and capital assets.

3.      Reconstruction and Community Integration

Reconstruction efforts will play a pivotal role in fostering economic recovery and ensuring that communities affected by the conflict, particularly the Shia population, do not perceive Hezbollah’s decline as their own. By addressing their grievances and providing services, the state can reclaim its role as the primary provider, thus preventing the rise of new radical movements.

4.      Border Security and Sovereignty

The government will need to secure all borders, ensuring the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces as mandated by international resolutions. Reestablishing state sovereignty over border regions is essential to reducing external interference and preventing the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and funds to and from any terrorist organization. Full sovereignty is only achieved when the state holds the sole monopoly on the use of force, necessitating the disarmament of all non-state armed groups to ensure both internal stability and international security.

5.      Judicial System and Accountability

The new administration must address corruption within the judiciary and prevent political interference to uphold the rule of law, thereby demonstrating Lebanon’s commitment to accountability and justice. These efforts will also pave the way for two key investigations to be carried out:

-   The investigation into the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, which has faced strong opposition from Hezbollah and could implicate its members.

-   The examination of the Central Bank and the broader banking system, which could expose corruption among key political figures.

6.      Preparing for the 2026 Legislative Elections

The new administration must ensure that the 2026 Legislative Elections serve as a referendum on Lebanon’s trajectory. If current domestic and international trends persist, and the government successfully restores institutional trust, Hezbollah’s influence will likely diminish. The elections could pave the way for a popular mandate to complete Hezbollah’s disarmament, a process that might face resistance but would mark a major step toward national sovereignty and stability.

In conclusion, the next 18 months represent a pivotal juncture for Lebanon, offering a rare opportunity to enact reforms, rebuild institutional trust, and begin addressing the complexities of Hezbollah’s disarmament. Success during this period could pave the way for a more stable, sovereign, and democratic Lebanon, with positive ramifications for the broader Middle East. Yet the road ahead is fraught with challenges that demand strategic foresight, unwavering political will, and coordinated international engagement. Consequently, it is crucial to monitor the new administration’s approach to the six outlined priorities, evaluating both its resolve and adaptability in the face of inevitable hurdles.

Despite not being directly elected by the people and rising to power through a parliament still marred by elements of the corrupt political class and Hezbollah, Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam have garnered significant popular support, as evidenced by widespread activity on the streets and social media. The two men bring new hope to the Lebanese people and positioning themselves to potentially capitalize on their success in the upcoming legislative elections.

This transitional period provides a moment to restore democratic practices in Lebanon. For decades, Lebanese leadership has been shaped by foreign powers, once dictated by Paris, then Damascus and Tehran, and now influenced by Washington and Riyadh. To shield itself from external interference and the destabilizing effects of international tensions, Lebanon must strive for geopolitical neutrality. The country needs time to recover and rebuild its social, political, and economic foundations.

Central to this recovery is a transformation of Lebanon’s political culture. The reliance on individual leaders and their personal visions must give way to a system grounded in strong institutions. While history shows that nations often turn towards individuals during crises, only those that transitioned to institutional governance have achieved enduring stability. Institutions provide continuity, resilience, and the stability necessary to break free from cycles of turmoil and external manipulation.

If Lebanon seizes this opportunity to prioritize institutional reform and inclusivity, it can move toward a future where its people, not foreign actors, determine its destiny. This is Lebanon’s chance to lay the groundwork for long-term sovereignty, institutional democracy, and prosperity. While there is room for optimism, the potential for setbacks remains high, as the responses of Iran and Hezbollah, along with the disarmament process and the broader evolution of regional geopolitics, will ultimately determine whether this transition leads to lasting success or a relapse into turmoil.

February 2025: Disarming Hezbollah: A Geopolitical Necessity

Key Notes

•   Iran’s Shift to Destabilization: With its regional control strategy failing, Iran is likely pivoting to denial tactics, converting Hezbollah into a guerilla force to sustain regional instability rather than achieving regional hegemony.

•   The Urgency of Disarmament: Hezbollah’s military wing must be fully dismantled to restore Lebanese sovereignty, whether through democratic resolution or state-led action.

•   Lebanon’s Priorities: Short-term: securing the ceasefire and IDF withdrawal; Post-2026 elections: advancing a peace deal and achieving disarmament; Long-term: enshrining constitutional neutrality.

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the State of Israel and the Hezbollah terrorist organization represented a significant step toward halting hostilities and outlining a framework for future stability. To situate this agreement within its historical context, Hezbollah had emerged from the conflict militarily weakened, its popular base fractured, and its domestic standing in Lebanon increasingly precarious. Facing mounting internal and external pressure, Hezbollah sought an exit strategy, making the agreement a strategic necessity.

However, was the conflict ripe for resolution at that stage? Likely not. Both parties maintained contingency plans. For Hezbollah, reliance on the Assad regime provided a pathway to replenish its military capabilities, restore key infrastructure, and secure financial resources to maintain its support base. For Israel, the agreement offered a temporary halt, but it retained the option to resume military operations if Hezbollah violated the terms or if Lebanon’s political process deviated from the anticipated trajectory.

Unexpectedly, the collapse of the Assad regime disrupted Hezbollah’s strategic calculations, undermining its ability to rearm and reorganize. Consequently, the political roadmap in Lebanon unfolded largely as envisioned: Joseph Aoun was elected president despite Hezbollah’s opposition, and the Prime Minister was appointed in defiance of its influence. To date, Israel’s contingency strategy remains intact, while Hezbollah’s has largely disintegrated. However, recent developments suggest that Hezbollah has now activated a Plan C, adapting to new geopolitical realities.

Lebanon’s Legal Standing and the Question of Sovereignty

Throughout its operations in Lebanon, Israel refrained from targeting critical national infrastructure, unlike in the 2006 war, and avoided direct strikes on Lebanese political figures. The framing of the war as a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, rather than between the State of Israel and the Lebanese Republic, was a strategic choice. This distinction likely served multiple purposes: (1) avoiding a direct confrontation with a sovereign state, which could have triggered legal consequences under International Law; (2) preventing international condemnation by presenting the operation as a counterterrorism effort rather than an act of aggression; and (3) maintaining a post-war narrative that would facilitate regional de-escalation and prevent the emergence of new grievances.

This approach holds significance because Lebanon, as a founding member of the United Nations, enjoys a set of international rights that, for instance, the State of Palestine lacks. Lebanon also had a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and benefits from the historical support of France, a permanent Security Council member with veto power, although with questionable reliability.

From a legal standpoint, Lebanon has only formally declared war on Israel once, in 1948, and has refrained from direct involvement in subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts. However, Hezbollah hijacked Lebanon’s sovereignty in the 1980s, effectively usurping the state’s exclusive right to declare war and conduct foreign policy. Under the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles 7 and 9), Lebanon could be held accountable for failing to prevent Hezbollah from breaching International Law and endangering international peace and security. Hezbollah’s activities, including threats to Cyprus and its transnational narcotrafficking networks, further implicate the Lebanese state in its failure to assert control over its territory.

Yet, responsibility does not rest solely on Lebanon. Iran, by its own admission, has consistently funded and supported Hezbollah, making it legally complicit in Hezbollah’s actions under international law. A precedent for this exists in the ICJ ruling in Nicaragua v. United States (1986), which established that a state providing direct financial and military support to an armed group can be held responsible for that group’s conduct.

Tensions escalated in the final days of the conflict, with a heightened risk of confrontation between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite the LAF’s non-involvement in hostilities, the potential for a direct clash between two sovereign states became increasingly plausible. This moment proved critical, as it could have precipitated a state-to-state war with profound implications under International Law. It is likely that this risk contributed to the eventual Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, as both sides sought to avoid the unpredictable consequences of a broader escalation.

Iran’s Regional Strategy Shift to Destabilization

Zooming out to Iran’s broader regional strategy, its approach has long been predicated on exploiting local grievances to further its geopolitical ambitions. Tehran has systematically linked these grievances to its own projection of power, financing and arming militant groups across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen. This strategy aimed at establishing Iranian hegemony over the Middle East, using asymmetric warfare and proxy networks to challenge regional adversaries.

The October 7 attacks occurred at a pivotal moment, seemingly designed to derail the Saudi-Israeli normalization process. The hostage-taking strategy aimed to prevent an all-out war while compelling Israel to negotiate. However, the extent to which the Netanyahu government was willing to escalate the conflict was underestimated. The response of the Arab states to the attack was also milder than anticipated. Hezbollah, despite its ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, limited its engagement to symbolic strikes rather than capitalizing on Israel’s entanglement in Gaza to advance its long-standing objective of “liberating Jerusalem.”

One year after the October 7 attacks, Iran’s proxy network has significantly weakened, an outcome difficult to reconcile with the presumed strategic objectives behind the assault. Paradoxically, while the attack aimed at reinforcing Iran’s regional influence, its long-term effect has been the fragmentation of Tehran’s armed alliances. This has led to cautious optimism, though much remains uncertain. In response to this deterioration, Iran’s regional strategy is likely shifting. Having lost the ability to control the region, Tehran may now seek to deny control to others, namely, Saudi Arabia and the United States, by fostering instability.

Hezbollah’s role is central to this adaptation. Rather than maintaining it as a highly structured, state-like military force, Iran may now convert Hezbollah into a guerrilla force, a far less costly and more sustainable model. A guerrilla insurgency is easier to fund, harder to eliminate, and can perpetuate instability without requiring the same level of logistical infrastructure. For now, Hezbollah has already begun employing constitutional mechanisms to stall the formation of a functional government, while simultaneously engaging in public demonstrations of strength, notably through symbolic returns to war-torn towns in the South despite opposition from the Lebanese state and military.

With Iran’s control strategy crumbling, its likely pivot to destabilization raises urgent questions about regional security. If Tehran can no longer exert hegemony, it will seek to prevent any other actor from consolidating power, ensuring that instability remains a bargaining tool for future negotiations. This shift exposes the inherent contradictions in Iran’s rhetoric. For decades, Tehran has framed its regional activities as part of a mission to “liberate Jerusalem”, yet its actions revealed a purely strategic use of regional grievances rather than genuine ideological commitment. The populations it once claimed to defend may increasingly recognize that they were merely instruments in a hegemonic agenda.

Disarmament: A Strategic Necessity

In this context, the disarmament of Hezbollah is now imperative: there should be no compromise. Its status as an armed, non-state actor operating independently of the Lebanese government is no longer tenable. Disarmament must be total, ensuring that Hezbollah no longer functions as a parallel military force capable of destabilizing the region and unable to transform into a guerrilla force. While peaceful disarmament remains the optimal outcome, alternative scenarios must be considered given the complex political and military landscape in Lebanon.

A. Democratic Resolution

The 2026 Legislative Elections could present the first truly free and fair democratic process in Lebanon since 1975, untainted by the coercive influence once exerted by the Assad regime or Hezbollah. Through the electoral process, the Lebanese people could assert their will and politically sanction those who have undermined national stability.

A decisive election outcome would translate into an executive decision to disarm Hezbollah, to which its political wing would comply. This would initiate a DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) process, marking the formal transition of Hezbollah’s armed faction into a non-military entity. With a strengthened and well-equipped Lebanese Armed Forces, the state could then finish its deployment in the South.

B. State-Led Dissolution

If peaceful efforts to disarm Hezbollah fail, the Lebanese Republic could resort to formal designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, leading to its forced dissolution and the prosecution of its leadership. This approach would likely necessitate military enforcement, which could take one of two forms:

1- Domestic Military Confrontation

The LAF could engage Hezbollah in a direct military confrontation and counterinsurgency. The scale and intensity of such a conflict would be unprecedented, with risks of destabilizing Lebanon further and provoking external interventions.

2- International Intervention

If Lebanon acknowledges its inability to disarm Hezbollah, it could formally request the use of force on its territory through two legal mechanisms under International Law. First, it could seek intervention via the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If this effort fails due to a veto, Lebanon could alternatively authorize an international coalition to conduct military operations on its territory, provided it formally grants consent under International Law.

Three critical steps for Lebanon’s trajectory

In the short term, the Lebanese state must reaffirm its commitment to upholding the ceasefire agreement until it is fully capable of asserting sovereign control over the southern border region. The full withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon must be fast and met with the comprehensive deployment of the LAF, ensuring that the state, not non-state actors, controls national security. This process must be expedited to prevent any vacuum that could justify the emergence of a new “resistance” movement. The LAF must receive enhanced logistical, intelligence, and material support from Arab and Western allies to ensure the success of this critical stabilization effort.

In the medium term, and most feasibly after the 2026 legislative elections, Lebanon must embark on a roadmap toward a peace agreement and mutual recognition with Israel under the framework of the Abraham Accords, led by the United States. This agreement should include a comprehensive resolution of territorial and maritime disputes, definitively ending any legal justification for hostilities. Moreover, such an accord would prohibit the use of Lebanese soil for military aggression, making any future violations a clear breach of Lebanese law. This, however, hinges on the Lebanese state taking full responsibility for enforcing its sovereignty and eliminating non-state actors’ capacities.

In the long run, once Lebanon has established stronger institutions and a stable economy, it must enshrine its neutrality in the constitution, formally committing the country to non-alignment in regional conflicts. This legal framework must explicitly prohibit Lebanese political parties from maintaining international affiliations or receiving foreign funding, ensuring that Lebanon’s sovereignty is not compromised by external actors. This final step would secure Lebanon’s long-term stability, preventing future entanglements in regional conflicts and safeguarding its independence.

Feb 2025: Why Lebanon Matters.

Key Notes

•   Case Study of a Frozen Conflict: Lebanon exemplifies how unresolved conflicts can lead to prolonged instability, making it a critical case for studying fragile states and conflicts.

•   A Regional Example: Lebanon’s trajectory could serve as an example for regional countries that have endured similar crises, reinforcing the role of global institutions, regional stability and peace.

•   Cautious Optimism: While Lebanon faces a historic opportunity for recovery, success hinges on precise reforms and diplomacy, with little room for error in avoiding further collapse.

Lebanon is both a theoretical model in practice and a compelling case study from which valuable lessons can be drawn. The country’s trajectory aligns with well-established theories on the origins of non-international armed conflicts, insurgency dynamics, and post-conflict state reconstruction. Frameworks addressing conflict resolution and political rebuilding—particularly those that emerged in the 1990s—offer a lens through which Lebanon’s experience can be analyzed. Whether in economic and financial dynamics, conflict resolution, or social cohesion, Lebanon exemplifies what theory predicts. The root causes of Lebanon’s civil war, shaped by the interplay of greed and grievances, the adoption of a power-sharing agreement as a settlement mechanism, the subsequent conflict freezing due to unresolved tensions, and the eventual military dominance leading to democratic erosion all reflect patterns identified in conflict studies and state fragility models. Lebanon is not an anomaly—it is a textbook case of how fragile states evolve when structural issues remain unaddressed.

At present, the state is embarking on a rebuilding process, where, over the next few years, a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategy will be critical to prevent Hezbollah from either transforming into a guerrilla force or fragmenting into more destabilizing elements. Understanding Lebanon not only clarifies its current position but also highlights the options ahead. Like many states in the region, Lebanon has been entangled in Iranian interference and proxy warfare, dragged into a conflict not of its own making. Consequently, many countries in the Middle East have suffered. But a cautious optimism is taking hold among the Lebanese population and international actors as prospects for recovery and stability gradually strengthen. Lebanon’s future, therefore, is not just a local concern—it stands as a potential example for how states burdened by similar struggles can reclaim sovereignty, rebuild institutions, restore prosperity, and contribute to regional peace. This is why Lebanon matters.

Examining Lebanon’s current events has made it possible to explore potential outcomes, assess opportunities and risks, and revisit history to understand how the country arrived at this moment. The road ahead is best described as one of cautious optimism—a historic opportunity for recovery exists, but it comes with an exceptionally narrow margin for error. The right combination of reforms, diplomacy, and resilience could set Lebanon on a path toward stability and prosperity, while even minor missteps could push it back into turmoil. Ultimately, Lebanon’s future will be determined not just by policies and international agreements but by the resilience of its people and their ability to reclaim their country. Whether this moment becomes a turning point or yet another chapter of missed opportunities remains to be seen—but History is being written in real-time, and the stakes have never been higher.

History, when written in retrospect, often condenses decades of struggle into a few lines in a textbook, but for those who live through it—individuals, communities, and entire nations—the pain is real and enduring. Macro analysis, largely focused on political, economic, and strategic considerations, often overlooks an undeniable micro reality: the immense suffering of the people —a result of years of conflict, shifting geopolitics, crises of identity, and the failures (or absence) of leadership.

 Two Frozen Conflicts

Until very recently, Lebanon was on its way to becoming a failed state. Years of corruption, hyperinflation, and the takeover of state institutions by a terrorist organization left the country barely functioning. Its sovereign debt soared, its institutions eroded, and its population fell into despair. Many of its youth emigrated, while those who stayed saw their living standards collapse. In fact, Lebanon suffered from two frozen conflicts, conflicts that are neither fully resolved nor actively raging, in contrast to the academic definition, which typically refers to an ongoing conflict stuck in a deadlock. The first was an internal struggle rooted in the power-sharing agreement that ended the civil war. The second was an external confrontation between Hezbollah’s militia and the State of Israel, sustaining an uneasy truce and directly stemming from the unresolved nature of the first conflict.

1- The Internal Frozen Conflict: A Fragile Power-Sharing System

The 1989 Taif Agreement, which formally ended the Lebanese Civil War, introduced constitutional reforms aimed at restoring peace and stability. It reduced the powers of the presidency, shifting authority to the Council of Ministers, and adjusted the sectarian balance in Parliament by granting equal representation to Christians and Muslims. While these changes transformed Lebanon into a parliamentary republic and appeased demands for confessional (religious) balance, they also weakened the executive branch, making governance dependent on a fractured and often dysfunctional Parliament. The warlords of the civil war simply transitioned into political leaders, bringing their rivalries into the legislative chambers, resulting in chronic instability, volatility, and entrenched corruption.

This power-sharing system incentivized corruption, as fragile coalitions made party leaders kingmakers, while the absence of an independent judiciary left no mechanisms for accountability. Instead of resolving the conflict, Taif effectively froze it in time—it ended the bloodshed but failed to enact the deeper constitutional reforms necessary for long-term stability. The agreement prioritized peace over effectiveness, but it was never meant to be the final stage. Lebanon needed to evolve beyond this temporary settlement, adapting its political system and strengthening its institutions to prevent a return to crisis. By failing to do so, the country remained locked in a frozen state, unable to transition into a more sustainable and resilient governance model, ultimately paving the way for the militia’s takeover.

2- The External Frozen Conflict: Hezbollah’s State Capture

The Taif Agreement mandated the disarmament of all militias that participated in the war. However, Hezbollah refused to comply, branding itself as a “resistance” force against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. It linked its disarmament to the full liberation of Lebanese territory, thereby circumventing the agreement. In 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon. But Hezbollah did not surrender its weapons. Instead, it revealed its true objective: the consolidation of its military and political dominance over Lebanon while serving as an extension of Iran’s regional influence. Gradually, the state eroded into failure as the militia expanded and metastasized, rendering the government increasingly lethargic.

Since, the southern border has become a militarized zone with a heavy presence of international observers, aimed at preventing armed skirmishes. This effectively froze the conflict in place—an improvement over full-scale war but a compromise on achieving a lasting resolution. It was more of a truce than genuine peace, as demonstrated by the escalations in 2006 and 2023. This frozen conflict became Hezbollah’s primary justification for maintaining its arsenal, consolidating control over the state, and silencing critics under the guise of “resistance,” often labeling those who advocate for Lebanese sovereignty as collaborators or traitors. Thus, Hezbollah exploited the Taif Agreement to entrench its military and political dominance, using it as a vehicle to extend Iran’s hegemony in the region. Hezbollah actively solidified the frozen state of the first conflict, obstructed reforms, shielded corrupt politicians, suppressed opposition, and systematically eroded the Lebanese state.

The Collapse of the Status Quo

In 2024, the second frozen conflict began to unravel rapidly as Hezbollah suffered a severe military and political weakening following its defeat by Israel. Lebanon’s recovery must begin with the resolution of both its frozen conflicts. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 lay the groundwork for ending the external conflict and facilitating the disarmament of Hezbollah. This, in turn, creates an opportunity to resolve the internal frozen conflict, as Lebanon must now pursue institutional reforms, combat corruption, and uphold democratic principles to transition toward a more stable and sustainable political and social system.

Lebanon, a Better Example of Conflict Resolution?

Lebanon’s recovery would not only mark a success for international institutions but also offer a political and economic blueprint for other countries in the region that have suffered from similar Iranian-backed destabilization. Lebanon could prove that a nation, even after years of corruption and foreign interference, can reclaim its sovereignty and rebuild its economy within a rules-based international order. Its success would demonstrate that economic liberalization, combined with institutional reforms, can provide a viable alternative to the model of Iranian-backed militias and authoritarian entrenchment that has spread across Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. While the origins of the ongoing conflicts in these countries differ, Iranian intervention has emerged as a common variable, diverting the conflicts from their rightful causes. Despite variations in their socio-political landscapes, their current struggles stem from Iran’s takeover. Restoring sovereignty, upholding the rule of law, and rebuilding social cohesion are essential for their future stability.

1- A Test for the International Liberal Order

The rehabilitation of Lebanon could demonstrate that post-World War II institutions, including the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, remain vital mechanisms for conflict resolution and economic stabilization. Despite recent global trends that challenge the liberal world order, Lebanon’s recovery could reaffirm the effectiveness of these institutions, particularly in the eyes of developing nations that have grown skeptical of Western-led multilateralism.

If UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is properly implemented, leading to Hezbollah’s disarmament, it will reinforce the credibility of international diplomacy. Likewise, if the IMF, alongside other financial institutions and creditors, helps Lebanon navigate its economic crisis, it will restore trust in the existing global economic frameworks. This, in turn, could dissuade struggling nations from turning toward China’s alternative financial institutions, which often come with opaque agreements and long-term dependency.

2- A Model for Regional Peace

More broadly, Lebanon’s recovery could serve as a catalyst for a more stable Middle East. The disarmament of Hezbollah would demonstrate to other states grappling with non-state armed forces that such a process is both possible and essential for national recovery. Moreover, by reclaiming its sovereignty, Lebanon could contribute to regional peace, particularly in the aftermath of the conflict with Israel. This would align with broader regional trends of recognizing Israel while continuing to work toward a resolution of the Palestinian issue and the Two States Solution.

By showcasing the economic and cultural benefits of abandoning a culture of war and militancy, Lebanon can reclaim its regional standing and present an alternative path for other nations to follow. A successful Lebanon could shift regional dynamics by proving that national sovereignty, economic integration, and diplomatic engagement are more sustainable than proxy wars and militia control. If Lebanon achieves lasting stability, it could serve as a case study for post-conflict reconstruction across the Middle East, reinforcing the idea that durable peace is possible through institutional reforms and strategic diplomacy.

3- A Model for Social Cohesion

Beyond politics and economics, Lebanon’s recovery holds profound social implications. If it succeeds in healing its deep demographic rupture, one that has historically fueled sectarian tensions, it could serve as an example for other multiethnic and heterogeneous societies struggling with social cohesion. The Lebanese experience could offer lessons on how to forge a more inclusive social contract where coexistence is prioritized over division, a model that could be relevant not only in the Middle East but also in other fractured societies across the globe.

Lebanon has long been a microcosm of competing identities, external influences, and religious sects coexisting in a fragile equilibrium. If it manages to reform its governance model to one that is more representative, inclusive, and less susceptible to foreign interference, it could become a model for pluralistic societies facing similar fragmentation. The country’s recovery would highlight how power-sharing agreements, when properly adjusted and reinforced by strong institutions, can facilitate long-term stability rather than perpetuate cycles of conflict.