From Crisis to Coherence: COVID-19 Lessons for a Unified EU Diplomatic and Security Architecture
Key Notes
• COVID-19 Challenges: The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the EU’s vulnerability to transnational crises when member states prioritize national responses. Only once central institutions were empowered did the EU regain cohesion, revealing the limits of fragmented authority in managing cross-border threats to public health and stability.
• Structural Challenges in Diplomacy and Security: Fragmented foreign policy and divergent threat perceptions across member states continue to obstruct unified EU action in diplomacy and defense. Institutional constraints and sovereignty concerns mirror the early COVID-19 dynamics, limiting credibility and agility on the global stage.
• Toward a Unified Voice: Europe’s pandemic experience proved that trust in central institutions can unlock effective coordination. The same logic applies to foreign policy: advancing a unified diplomatic voice requires pre-delegated authority, institutional reform, and the political will to act collectively in complex crises.
Abstract
The European Union’s experience with the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the institutional fragilities and political tensions inherent in managing transnational crises within a framework built on shared sovereignty. Initial responses were marked by re-nationalization, competition for resources, and a lack of solidarity. However, once authority and coordination coalesced around central EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, the Union delivered a comprehensive and forward-looking response that included large-scale fiscal programs, health system support, and strategic vaccine deployment.
This pattern, fragmented national reactions followed by late-stage institutional convergence—offers valuable lessons for other domains where collective action remains elusive. Nowhere is this more urgent than in the EU’s foreign policy and security architecture. With rising global instability, shifting alliances, and divergent threat perceptions among member states, the EU’s capacity to act as a unified strategic actor remains limited. Fragmentation persists not only in diplomatic engagement but also in crisis response, sanctions enforcement, and geopolitical positioning, most visibly in the cases of Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.
Building a more cohesive and credible foreign policy requires institutional reform, including a strengthened Foreign Affairs Council, expansion of Qualified Majority Voting, and a clearer mandate for member states under a common diplomatic umbrella. France’s symbolic gesture of associating its UN Security Council seat with EU leadership could catalyze this shift. A unified diplomatic voice would not only enhance the EU’s global leverage but also pave the way for future integration in security and defense.
Just as the pandemic revealed that no member state could manage a transnational health crisis alone, today’s geopolitical instability underscores the limits of fragmented foreign policies. The stakes may differ, but the institutional challenge is the same.
Keywords: European Union, COVID-19, sovereignty, foreign policy, institutional reform
Introduction
The Fathers of Europe’s dream of a long-lasting peace on a continent devastated by two consecutive World Wars culminated in the European Union that we know today. It is a project that aimed to reconcile warring nations through dialogue, cooperation, and economic growth by interdependency. This dream evolved throughout the second half of the Twentieth century, going from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to the European Economic Community of 1957, and finally to the establishment of the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The EU is the best application of the theory of Liberalism in International Relations, the product of democracy, economic interdependency, and institutionalization. There is no doubt that the complex result succeeded in maintaining peace, promoting democracy, and insuring the collective economic growth within its borders. However, the Union must still interact with the outside world, where “anarchy” rules according to the Classical theory of International Relations. This interaction brought to the EU most of its past and recent challenges that threatened the structure’s security, cohesion, and solidarity. Since the beginning of the Twenty-first century, multiple crises originating outside the EU affected its destiny. The Great Recession of 2008 that began in the USA revealed the cracks within the EU and caused the Crisis of the Euro Zone. The wars in Africa and the Middle East exacerbated the displacement of population resulting in waves of refugees triggering a crisis in the EU. While the disintegration of Yugoslavia claims the title of “bring back war to the continent”, the invasion of Ukraine has successfully sent shockwaves throughout the continent and revived fears Europe has aimed never live again. Every crisis tested the strength of the Union, but only the Covid-19 pandemic challenged nearly the entire structure.
In December 2019, a whistleblower announced to the world the existence in China of a new highly contagious and deadly virus. Within weeks, benefitting from this globalized world interconnectivity, the virus travelled to nearly every country, starting the Global Covid-19 crisis. This was followed by an unprecedent confinement and shutdown of human activity, with a prudent and gradual easing of restrictions, while the big powers struggled to deliver vaccines and use it in their soft power projection. The EU was no exception; it was drastically hit by the pandemic and its population suffered thousands of casualties. In response, member states initially reinstalled national borders within the union, competed for resources, and failed each other when it came to solidarity. The race for the vaccine and the subsequent vaccine-diplomacy left the EU at a disadvantage especially post-Brexit. The EU began a journey that would test its capacities to sustain crisis, manage, and overcome. In what started as a disorganized and chaotic response, the EU suddenly found itself leading the “war” against the virus and emerged from it relatively stronger. To do so, the EU mobilized all its institutions, including the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, it political branches, and industrial capacities to mount a proper response. Through policies, funds, and management, the European Commission regained credibility and managed to pull the EU away from nationalistic politics and out of the crisis.
Retrospectively looking, the EU, institutions and member states alike, learned valuable lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic, which became obvious in the plans and programs set for the future. However, it remains pertinent to examine how the European institutions that successfully managed the crisis were part of the delayed and failed initial response. The EU’s complexity best explains the situation, its adaptability and resilience explain its continuity, and its innovation explains its successes. By understanding the EU’s response to COVID-19, we may gain insight into how the Union could confront future challenges in diplomacy and security, areas where the enduring tension between national sovereignty and collective action remains unresolved.
The EU’s Initial Response to the Pandemic
The EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic was a general mobilization of all institutions present aiming to tackle the crisis on all levels. It must be noted that the response was primarily led by the European Commission with tight coordination with national movements. The European Parliament passed during the pandemic multiple legislatures allowing the release of emergency aid to member states and specifically to their healthcare system ¹. This also followed the release of funds from the Commission aiming to support research in medicine, frontline health care workers, and aid to Europe and beyond. As the crisis lasted and the social effects lingered, more measures were required. The European Central Bank (ECB) introduced in March 2020 a nonstandard monetary policy, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP), that allowed it to purchase government bonds and maintain a low interest rate. The PEPP reached the €1850 billion according to the European Commission ². In addition, it helped on stabilizing banks and maintaining sufficient level of reserves to ensure the banking system is healthy and properly functioning ¹. In parallel, the European Investment Bank provided the necessary funding to projects targeting healthcare infrastructure, vaccine, and treatment research, in addition to lending activities targeting businesses and household ¹. The European Investment Fund (EIF) worked early on to support small businesses to survive the pandemic and grow afterward ¹.
The pandemic caused a severe disruption of the supply chain, depriving countries of trade and access to manufactured goods, including pharmaceutical ones. In response to that, the EU started a strategic reserve of medication ⁴. Also, local European manufacturers shifted their production to fight the disease and provided highly needed equipment.
Part of the EU’s fundings and strategy was towards the development of treatments and vaccines as well as the purchase of vaccine. This constituted the EU Vaccines Strategy that worked on multiple levels ⁵. It set the quality of the vaccine and ensured the safety and efficacy of the delivered product. The strategy aimed to provide the vaccine on a timely basis and make it affordable to EU member states. It secured the appropriate numbers of vaccines to every country and avoided mishandling of orders and precautionary purchases. It also provided recommendations on the handling, storage, and administration of the vaccine. The strategy was designed in a way to be a reference point to national governments when designing their own vaccine strategies ⁵. With respect to the EU’s global role, the strategy accounted for funds aimed at the development of the COVAX platform and the delivery of vaccines and aids to developing countries ⁵.
Institutional Recovery and Long-Term Planning
The EU’s response managed the crisis acutely, but it was also forward looking. The European Commission designed the “Recovery Plan for Europe” that includes the “Multiannual Financial Framework” for 2021-2027 and the “NextGenerationEU” ⁶. The ambitious long-term budget of more than €2000 billion will be a tool to boost the economy in multiple sectors in response to the pandemic. This will be achieved by providing funds to Horizon Europe to promote innovation and research. It also accounts for climate change by allocating funds to fight it and ensuring a faire transition through the Just Transition Funds. Moreover, it aims to maintain alertness and preparedness of the healthcare system and the EU in general. “NextGenerationEU” will also provide loans and grants to the same programs mentioned. In total, the budget will allow the redevelopment of multiple vital sectors, provide the necessary funds for innovative programs, and transition Europe out of the crisis, according to the needs of every sector and state.
The response of the EU to the Covid-19 pandemic activated multiple channels and provided unparalleled relief in a moment of despair. The experience left the EU contemplating its initial management, revealed underlining fractures, and pushed the institution to prepare for the future.
Lessons Learned and Sectoral Implications
From this crisis, Europe learned multiple lessons, starting with the long-term planning through the “Recovery Plan for Europe” which allowed the EU to internalize the climate response. The EU also learned a lesson on reediness and anticipation, but more importantly discovered new features of itself and got to understanding more its identity.
The European Commission identifies five major direct lessons from this crisis in Solidarity, Responsiveness, Preparedness, Capabilities, and Partnerships ⁸. The emphasis remains on the cooperation within the union and with allies, and the readiness for the future achieved by the programs and the budget. The Health Security in the EU conference report concludes by the importance of vigilance in the next phase ⁹. The report mentions the plan on the enlargement of the mandate of European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in an attempt to increase the readiness for future crisis. This goes in line with the Commissions pharmaceutical strategy adopted in November 2020 ¹⁰. It called to provide affordable medications, preserve competition and innovation in the industry, diversify supplies to escape the supply-chain disruption, and promote EU standards and safety to the world. This strategy might have affected France attempts to modernize its pharmaceutical sector. Having long relied on chemistry and suffered funding cuts, the industry is preparing itself to shift to biotechnology ¹¹. To do so, France will maintain its technology transfer initiatives (facilitate connection between research and industry) and laxed pharmaceutical regulation. In parallel, as announced in 2020, $6 billion dollars will go to fund health related research and a 50% increase in R&D funding over a ten-years period. This will ensure the modernization of the sector and consolidate its competitiveness.
The Robert Shuman Foundation identifies pertinent lessons to this pandemic on different levels ¹² . By describing the “Economic Recovery Plan as proof of the Union’s agility”, it mentions the consequence on EU regulations. The budget and the monetary policy have changed the reality of sovereign debts in Europe, demanding a change in the criteria set in the Maastricht Treaty. The budget is also seen as a revival of European integration. As the pandemic was global and affecting all countries, it uncovered the weakness in each member state’s system. The budget is a collective and central effort that is addressing the needs of each of those systems, demonstrating the rebirth of European integration. Moreover, by delegating the vaccine rollout to the EU, national governments saw the benefit of the transnational institution in implementing high level policies. However, the risk averse behavior of the Commission caused delays in the approval of the vaccines and the start of the vaccination campaign. This optimistic description of the Shuman Foundation is not shared by other political analysis that tackle the same issues with criticism.
Diagnosing Institutional Weaknesses
In an article of April 2020, Politico uncovered an early criticism of the European response to the Covid-19 crisis ¹³. It started by flagging the lack of preparedness despite the weeks of warning in the day leading to the outbreak, where the pandemic was still seen as a Chinese issue and not a global one. Critics of the EU’s pre-pandemic also note the cuts in funding targeting health programs and medical supplies. The slow response observed in the union is attributed to the lack of coordination between member states and the lack of centralized power that can take effective union-wide measures. This was translated into a misuse of already scarce medical equipment and the ineffective redistribution to areas in great need. This is due to low stocks of equipment and poor communication among states. The absence of centralization also led to uncoordinated testing standards and guidance disturbing the process of de-confinement and population movement. Finally, the article blames the chaotic situation on a lack of solidarity among states, where governments prioritized national interest over those of the EU. The same criticism was seen in the Carnegie Europe article of April 2021 ¹⁴ . This article revisits the same points previously mentioned and adds the bureaucratic aspect of the EU as a hindering agent of the common response in complex decision-making institutions. This is also the result of the EU lack of authority and the predominance of national government power on their territory. Thus, one sentence could summaries well the situation, the “EU states are too integrated to manage the crisis separately and not integrated enough to do so collectively”. The article comes at a time where vaccine rollout has started, with a slow pace due to the EU’s inability to procure sufficient doses, demotivating further and future delegation of power to Brussels. In a crisis where speed is needed, European leadership seemed trapped between popular support to their policy and medical or scientific expertise. According to this article, this showed a weak leadership in time of crises and setback to democratic regimes when compared to authoritarian China. In July 2021, an article from EuropeNow discussed the situation in an evolving crisis. The EU’s centralized vaccine strategy destined to show the block’s unity is criticized for having had a slow and poorly coordinated response. It also notes that the bureaucracy and internal constraints limited the EU’s ability to sing vaccine contracts that cause delays in their delivery. Criticism is also directed to the important yet shy number of €2.7 billion destined to procuring vaccines by the EU for a population of more than four hundred million, in contrast the UK $4 billion budget and a population of 66 million. However, the article notes that the EU was able to close the gap between its vaccination rate and that of other developed nations, yet popular discontent remained due to a distortion from reality and the perception of inaccessible vaccine. The political consequences of these responses are the weakening of member states’ leaders due to their decline in popularity. Assuming those leaders’ general pro-EU stand points, their destabilization would deny the EU their support. In contrast, this has boosted the popularity of right winged partis providing them arguments to attack the EU. The article concludes that the EU has very few experiences in handling crisis on a micro level, where states and regions are able to deliver better.
From Pandemic to Policy: A Question of Centralization
The EU’s response on paper looks impeccable but turns out to be disconnected from reality on the grounds. Critics mainly focused on two major elements: bureaucracy and solidarity. The bureaucratic component is blamed to have failed to shield the EU through preemptive measures and slowed the vaccine rollout and coordination. The solidarity component is blamed for the selfishness of member states in sharing resources and providing help in times of crisis. However, those two components are interrelated where it is difficult to know what causes the other if not properly studied. The EU’s known bureaucracy could have led governments to act selfishly, or the selfless governments could have hindered the EU’s proactiveness by amplifying its bureaucracy. One component is left out so far, the type of crisis this is, one that imposed confinement, one that causes damage faster than any previous crisis. While the EU’s bureaucracy successfully led the union through the Eurozone crisis, it acted fast yet over a period of six years. This crisis was developing within month, depriving the EU from the luxury of time. It is safe to argue that the inexperience of the EU in this domain and its bureaucracy created a void that allowed national government to step in, in what seemed to be selfish acts. However, this was dictated by the circumstances, and the European solidarity reemerged once the EU took the leadership.
It is thus pertinent to say that European integration could have place itself in an awkward position that would paralyses any immediate response. This is due to the lack of centralized power and the need for consent concerning every policy. Pushing forward in this integration seems impossible as long as nationalism and inter-state inequalities remain political slogans. Pushing backwards would deprive all members of the benefits and shared growth the EU provided. At this point, the EU seems an adjuvant to national governments, lacking jurisdiction and authority to act more, yet is expected to. The EU’s institutions are limited by what governments delegate to them. This opens the question about the identity of this union, being political, economic, or normative. Popular expectations mismatch the role the EU is given so far, and the comparison of the EU to other global power is misleading. In fact, the EU is a particular type of power that is still in the process of building and refinement. Every crisis the EU went through left a mark in its people and institutions, shaping the union and preparing it for the next crisis. The EU is in a long and ambitious nation building process, a process with unknown outcome as it is setting precedent. It will rely on its leadership belief in this union and the will of its people to transform it and carry it to the future.
Drawing conclusions from the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU had its first attempt to acute crisis management. It has so far had the opportunity to tackle political crisis like Brexit, financial during the Eurozone crisis, and sanitary during the pandemic. Each added to the EU complexity and resilience, solidifying in each sector the EU’s role. The war in Ukraine is the opportunity to complete this solidification and grant the EU a common defense strategy and means.
The legend of Europa was passed to us from the Classical Age explaining the creation of the Old Continent. For its part, the EU will remain legendary for having buried the hatchet between France and Germany and leading the Old Continent through some of the most challenging times of this century. Despite the delay in the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU provided its member states with a tailored and holistic package of policies and monetary reliefs to assist them managing the crisis and emerging from it. In April 2022, the EU announced “moving out of emergency phase of the Covid-19 pandemic signaling the end of this exogenous crisis while recommending vigilance and surveillance ¹⁶.
It seems evident that with every crisis, more power is given to the European Institutions to lead the Union, centralizing the decision away from national capitals yet maintaining their influence. The Euro paved the way to this transformation; the Euro zone crisis reaffirmed the Union’s attachment to it which allowed for drastic measures to be taken to salvage the currency. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic proved the necessity of a more assertive and capable Commission that coordinates responses on a Union level. Finally, the invasion of Ukraine reiterated the discussion around European security and defense. In a time where the American hegemony is challenged, the EU finds itself at a delicate position in the confrontation with China. The diplomatic visit of Von der Leyen to Beijing seems to signal the increasing importance of the Commission in international affairs. This could be a consequence of the pandemic, from which the member states understood the crucial coordinating role of the EU’s institution to present to the world a unified European image. Whether the crisis is political, economic, or sanitary, the pattern of the EU’s response seems clear and repetitive. Thus, the EU does not differentiate between the nature of the crisis but rather focusses on the response. It is clear that the EU refines its responses and builds its resilience through the strengthening of its institutions. The next crisis is shaping fast; the EU would rather have learned the lesson from the pandemic.
As the Union reflects on the limits and breakthroughs of its COVID-19 response, it becomes pertinent to consider how these lessons might inform its handling of other high-stakes, fragmented policy domains. Among them, foreign policy and collective security stand out as areas where divergent national positions and slow institutional responses mirror the early missteps of the pandemic. Just as a patchwork of national strategies initially hindered a unified health response, the EU today faces similar difficulties in articulating a cohesive diplomatic and strategic posture on the global stage. The pandemic illustrated both the vulnerabilities of decentralized reactions and the power of coordinated institutional action once momentum is achieved. Exploring how these insights could guide the Union’s gradual evolution toward a more unified diplomatic voice is a prerequisite for any credible European security architecture. Just as the pandemic revealed that no member state could manage a transnational health crisis alone, today’s geopolitical instability underscores the limits of fragmented foreign policies. The stakes may differ, but the institutional challenge is the same.
The EU’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges
The EU is currently navigating a complex array of challenges that test its diplomatic coherence and strategic resilience. As global dynamics shift, there is a growing voice within the EU advocating for an enhanced security framework, distinct from NATO. This sentiment largely stems from diminishing trust in the United States’ commitment, accentuated by fluctuating American foreign policy under different administrations.
However, the path to a robust European security structure is fraught with internal disagreement. Member states exhibit hesitancy in conceding more sovereignty, driven by a lack of mutual trust, convergence in their national interests, and a disparate perception of external threats. This divergence is palpable not only in security matters but also in diplomatic engagements, where the EU often struggles to present a unified front.
Recognizing that a unified diplomatic voice is a critical precursor to any cohesive security architecture is crucial, as the EU faces the urgent task of harmonizing its approach to address both current and emerging global crises effectively. Therefore, it is pertinent to first explore the landscape of the EU’s international relations and second, the rationale and options for a unified diplomatic voice as a precursor to a unified security structure. This approach aims to foster a more unified, consolidated, and capable Union in addressing multifaceted challenges through concessions and mutual understanding between member states.
The EU has maintained strong support for Ukraine in the face of Russian war, emphasizing the need for a recalibrated political and economic relationship with Moscow. This includes significant political, financial, and military aid, along with a robust sanction regime aimed at upholding International Law and European security principles. However, the threat perceived by the Eastern member states does not match the magnitude of the concerns held by their Western or Southern counterparts. This disparity is clearly demonstrated not only in the military support extended to Ukraine, but even more so in their diplomatic actions and public statements.
The systemic rivalry with China is marked by cooperation and competition. The EU is adjusting to more challenging engagements with China, reflecting broader global shifts. The union is actively working to strengthen its presence and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on promoting rules-based international order and navigating complex relationships with China. The EU’s substantial economic reliance on China, characterized by significant import and export activities, is increasingly viewed by some as a vulnerability. The ongoing debate about decoupling to mitigate this risk highlights the complexities involved, particularly because member states are dependent on China in varying degrees. For instance, China serves as a crucial market for German exports, which complicates the prospect of unified action across the EU.
The EU maintains a strong partnership with the UN, centering on peace operations and crisis management that are pivotal for global security. This collaboration is essential for tackling international security challenges and fostering a rule-based international order. In conflict-ridden areas like Libya and Syria, the EU's strategy emphasizes promoting UN-led solutions and encouraging dialogue to secure political stability and peace. This approach is part of a wider effort to stabilize regions affected by prolonged conflicts, using diplomatic avenues to facilitate ceasefires and political transitions. However, leadership in these initiatives often appears to be dominated by more diplomatically active countries such as France and, before Brexit, the UK. This has highlighted persistent discrepancies in priorities among EU member states.
More recently, in Gaza, the EU’s efforts are directed towards humanitarian aid and crisis management, aiming to alleviate the severe conditions caused by ongoing conflicts. The EU, through its High Representative for Foreign Affairs, expressed its criticism over the conduct of the war. The Spanish led effort to fully recognize the State of Palestine has created a momentum within the union, while clearly hinging their recognition to wider EU consensus, so far absent.
The migration crisis poses a significant challenge for the EU, necessitating a strategy that involves cooperation with countries of origin and transit to effectively manage migration flows. This includes partnerships aimed at enhancing border management and combating human trafficking. Easter states witnessed waives of Ukrainian migration as result of the war. Mediterranean states, most affected by the migration flows, have called for a more equitable distribution of responsibilities and resources among EU member states to handle the influx of migrants and refugees. This request underscores the need for a collective European response that not only manages but also integrates migrants and addresses their immediate humanitarian needs.
Toward a Unified Diplomacy
The European Union faces multiple challenges across its international relations, trade, climate change initiatives, migration policies, and conflict response efforts, with responses often fragmented due to diverging perspectives, conflicting interests, and varied perceptions of threats among member states. These times require a more centralized diplomatic voice that would enable better anticipatory measures and foster a more proactive and targeted response to global challenges.
The dilemma facing EU diplomacy today closely mirrors the institutional tensions witnessed during the COVID-19 crisis. In both cases, a centralized response proved necessary to overcome transnational threats, yet initial efforts were hampered by member states’ reluctance to relinquish control. Just as fragmented national health strategies delayed effective pandemic management, divergent foreign policy priorities now obstruct a coherent diplomatic posture. The slow rollout of vaccines due to bureaucratic caution and uneven solidarity echoes the current hesitancy around diplomatic integration — where consensus is elusive and action is slowed by institutional design. The pandemic thus offers a cautionary parallel: crisis coordination cannot rely on ad hoc cooperation alone but requires pre-delegated authority and trust in shared institutions.
One way to achieve a unified diplomatic voice is for member states to agree on surrendering more sovereignty to a strengthened Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), as they previously did in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties and subsequently to EU institutions. This would significantly bolster the EU’s diplomatic effectiveness and credibility on the global stage.
To enhance decision-making within the FAC and unify the EU’s foreign policy voice, several adjustments could be considered. Firstly, shifting more decisions to Qualified Majority Voting could facilitate quicker and more efficient decision-making processes, reducing the gridlock that unanimity often creates. Also, the adopted decisions should thereafter apply even to member states that initially opposed them, thereby ensuring a more cohesive policy stance. Additionally, establishing clearer guidelines and frameworks for member states’ individual foreign policies under the umbrella of FAC decisions could guide national actions and promote consistency across the EU.
Such measures would strengthen the EU’s ability to act as a unified actor on the global stage, enhancing its diplomatic leverage and effectiveness. The measures would minimize the potential external interference in the EU through blocking the union’s decision-making by manipulating member states. Moreover, it would set the stage for a unified security structure, which will later on enhance the credibility of EU diplomacy with a reliable security force to support it.
As the historically most diplomatically active EU member, France could spearhead the move towards a unified diplomatic voice by collaborating its permanent UN Security Council seat with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and the FAC. This gesture of sharing sovereignty would be a powerful signal of France’s commitment to strengthening EU diplomacy and enhancing collective decision-making. This move would alleviate the concerns of member states apprehensive about deeper integration, while signaling to the international community a pivotal enhancement in the EU’s credibility.
Conclusion
The EU should transition from being primarily an economic and customs union with loosely coordinated diplomatic and security ties, to a formidable international player. This evolution is essential if the union aims to remain relevant and safeguard the economic and vital interests of its member states in these increasingly challenging times. EU member states need to recognize that the concerns and perceived threats of one are shared by all. Adopting a mentality where France’s borders extend to Belarus and Poland’s to the Mediterranean encourages synergistic behavior among countries, fostering a willingness to collaborate more closely for robust and unified diplomacy on the short run, and a security structure on the long run.
Only once a common diplomatic platform is consolidated can the EU begin to credibly pursue a common defense structure. This does not require replicating NATO but rather building complementary mechanisms that reflect European strategic interests. As with the Recovery Plan post-COVID, legitimacy and momentum for such reforms will grow as institutions prove capable and deliver value. A more centralized diplomatic posture could serve as the first step in this trajectory.
Europe’s pandemic experience highlighted the dangers of disjointed responses to shared threats, but also the capacity of its institutions to adapt, coordinate, and lead once entrusted. Security and diplomacy, while distinct, are similarly entangled in questions of legitimacy, delegation, and institutional design. By approaching them with the same mix of caution and ambition that eventually defined its COVID-19 strategy, the EU has the opportunity to emerge more unified, more resilient, and better prepared for the crises to come.
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