Belt & Road Initiative amid the Ukraine War

International SecurityWritten by Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon

Nov 10

Key Notes

The Ukraine war fractured BRI’s original strategic map in CEE: EU-adjacent states suspended or exited cooperation with BRI due to rising distrust of China’s intentions and fear of geopolitical alignment with Russia.
BRI investment did not collapse, but shifted: projects in frontline or high-risk transit states were paused, while investment flowed southward into alternative corridors such as the Trans-Caspian route.
China’s future success in CEE depends on post-war adaptation: long-term influence will require reconstruction diplomacy, new financial partnerships with local institutions, and the preservation of paused projects so they can be revived after the conflict.

Abstract

With a focus on how geopolitical shifts have reshaped Chinese infrastructure investment patterns across the region, this paper analyzes the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The paper demonstrates that the war produced uneven outcomes for China’s strategic engagement by dividing CEE into three subregions: EU-aligned states, countries geographically or politically close to the conflict, and southern CEE states outside the direct conflict and EU sphere. EU member and candidate states have increasingly distanced themselves from the BRI due to concerns about economic overdependence and China’s ambiguous stance toward Russia. Countries located along the core transit corridors of the New Eurasian Land Bridge have seen BRI projects paused because of logistical insecurity and sanctions exposure. Conversely, southern CEE states have experienced an expansion of Chinese investment as Beijing sought alternative transport routes and supply chains circumventing Russia. The paper concludes by offering policy recommendations for China to sustain long-term influence in the region, including proactive post-war reconstruction planning, diversification of investment channels, and the institutionalization of trust-building mechanisms with European partners.

Context and Scope

The Ukraine war has significantly affected China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The conflict reshaped investment priorities and strategic engagement across three regional areas: countries with close ties to the EU, those geographically or politically close to the war, and southern CEE states outside both the EU sphere and the direct conflict zone.

Each region experienced distinct outcomes. Many EU countries either withdrew from the 17+1 initiative or suspended BRI investments, concerned that the initiative served as a vehicle for Chinese influence in Western Europe and could create excessive economic dependence on China. In countries close to the conflict, China halted BRI progress due to heightened geopolitical tension and security risks, including fears that cargo or infrastructure could be affected by the fighting. In contrast, southern CEE states saw increased BRI activity as the region emerged as China’s alternative route into Western Europe.

To sustain influence after the conflict, China will need to maintain the new relationships built during this period, prepare infrastructure plans to support post-war reconstruction in countries such as Ukraine, and ensure that paused projects remain ready for resumption once conditions stabilize.

Strategic Background: BRI and the 17+1 Framework

BRI within Central and Eastern Europe falls under the 17+1 initiative created in 2019 involving: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Latvia left the initiative in 2021 regarding a dispute involving Taiwan’s sovereignty, and Latvia and Estonia followed suit in 2022 (Reinštein, 2023). These countries are on the historical Silk Road that connects Central Asia to Eastern Europe through the New Eurasia Land Bridge (NELB) (Bharti, 2022). The 17+1 initiative was introduced as a mutually beneficial collaboration between China and the CEE. The CEE is an important region for China, linking Asia and Europe by land and cargo rails. The transport corridors go through Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Kazakhstan, as they are the fastest and most developed (Wnukowski, 2017). The initiative would allow the CEE to gain modern infrastructure and economic investment, an alternative to the EU and its costly and bureaucratic process. One of the largest concerns for CEE countries is old infrastructure. The key to many CEE countries’ economic development is investing in infrastructure, as their current capital is still emerging and in the West’s shadow (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019). Because of the CEE’s economic dependence on the European Union, they are bound by the EU’s own goals, regulations, and economy, having little autonomy (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019).

While this is a strategically important region for China, its investment in CEE is small, only 0.12% of total Outside Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) stock, or 1.92% of total Chinese OFDI to Europe, goes to the CEE countries. Of those countries, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Bulgaria receive the most (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2022). Compared to Western European countries, CEE countries have smaller labor costs, market size, and economic development (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2022).

Though the BRI came to CEE with many promises of development, very few projects have been completed. The largest completed project was with Poland, connecting the city Łódź and the Chinese city of Chengdu in the Sichuan region by railroad. In contrast, the 17+1’s flagship project from 2013 is still being constructed (Choroś-Mrozowska, 2019). Since 2016, the only infrastructure construction project in the Western Balkans to be completed is the Pupin Bridge in Serbia (Vörös, 2023). Alongside that, while China and Europe are important trade and investment partners, the Ukraine war brought with its distrust of the relationship, with many European, primarily Western, countries reassessing their ties with China due to China’s quiet stance on Russia’s actions in the war, causing them to reassess their economic dependency on China, and for Chinese investors to reconfigure their investments in the CEE (Bo, 2022).

Competing Interpretations

This literature review will cover the relationship between China’s BRI in the CEE region and how Ukraine’s war affected this relationship. One side of the argument viewed the BRI as a positive investment in CEE, a way to bring them into the global market, especially the Western one. They argue that even if the CEE is being taken advantage of, it’s still a better alternative than their situation. The other side of the argument views the BRI as using the CEE as a stepping stone with very loose benefits and no real hope for the future unless China changes its investment tactics. The Ukraine war meant that China in the CEE had to change, though its effects on BRI have still not fully become visible, as the situation changes with every new policy and action by all sides.

BRI’s Positive Investment in the CEE

An important factor about the CEE is its key regional location between Asia and Europe. As will be pointed out multiple times in this section, the feelings of frustration that the CEE held towards Western European EU members made it possible for the BRI to step in and provide a new perspective for the CEE. Voinescu and Moisoiu identify the CEE’s economic potential and global value in the production chain, making them indispensable for the BRI, whose funds are considered an attractive choice (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019). Bharti argues similarly to Voinescu and Moisoiu that while those CEE countries that have managed to achieve success with the BRI, even if it is fragile, have also opened themselves up to an increase in trade and investment opportunities that wouldn’t have been available otherwise (Bharti, 2022).

One of the key reasons that the CEE took the 17+1 initiative well, and why it is also a prime location to invest in, is not just its geographical location but also its dependence as a less developed country on foreign investment. Bharti argues that this increased China’s interest in the region and infrastructure project offers (Bharti, 2022). Bharti asserts that the BRI has successfully launched projects in the CEE despite its EU presence in the region, having won bids for many infrastructure projects (Bharti, 2022). Voinescu and Moisoiu consider the EU’s investment in the CEE to lack the integration steps needed for the CEE to be part of the West, full of bureaucracy that the CEE cannot afford, and high project fragmentation (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019). Bharti’s point argues that the 17+1 initiative had come in to fill the investment gap between the CEE and EU countries, especially in the beginning, when China provided technical and technological support (Bharti, 2022). As previously mentioned, unlike the EU, which has limited grants and infrastructure projects with the CEE, the BRI is an opportunity to economically transform the region and give China access to Europe’s markets (Bharti, 2022).

The CEE relationship with Western EU had deteriorated despite heavy economic dependency on the latter, creating an open space for China to step in (Vörös, 2023). Vörös argues, along with Bharti, that the West’s dismissal of the CEE is how China was able to step up and become the CEE’s alternative (Vörös, 2023; Bharti, 2022). Vörös contends that the feeling of having a peripheral role and feelings of frustration with the EU got addressed by the entrance of the 17+1 initiative in the region, as it made the CEE gain a larger spotlight in European politics (Vörös, 2023).

While the BRI within the CEE has given its economic opportunities to grow its trade and economy, Voinescu and Moisoiu point out that progress has been delayed, and the CEE’s ability to catch up to its western neighbors has been slow. This is also due to structural and navigational differences between the BRI and the CEE, which can be addressed if China were to propose clear policies that aren’t short-term but long-term with no hidden consequences (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019). Voinescu and Moisoiu argue that the initiative and the CEE have a possible mutually beneficial future. Still, the BRI must first address its regional shortcomings, especially regarding its lack of regional information (Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2019).

CEE as BRI Stepping Stone

While there may have been hope for the BRI in the CEE to succeed, many authors also argue that China is just using the CEE as a stepping stone to get to Europe, explaining why investment has been so lacking and with so little progress. Lucas and Lo clarify that there is no compelling reason for Beijing to invest in the CEE heavily, they are a secondary market for Chinese exports, their location to Western Europe can be circumvented by using water routes, and other than a few key countries such as Ukraine, there are very few natural resources unlike Africa or South America (Luca and Lo, 2022).

While Bharti argues for the positive side of BRI in the CEE, he also identifies key points within the CEE and BRI relationship where their relationship is unequal. He pointed out that investment in the CEE is lower than that in other countries around the world, especially in the CEE countries in the EU or with US ties (Bharti, 2022). Like Bharti, Vörös also noted both the benefits and negatives of the 17+1 initiative with the CEE. Unlike Bharti, who points out the unevenness in the relationship between the CEE and China, Vörös focuses on the fact that many critical infrastructure projects have been delayed, even with Chinese claims that they have shifted their focus to Eastern, not Western, Europe; when measuring shares of economic interaction, the CEE has the least amount (Vörös, 2023).

Jing points out that many CEE countries' expectations of the BRI vision did not match reality. China lacks adequate knowledge of the CEE market and legal system and has an unrealistic view that BRI investment will help CEE's economic growth instead of creating a growing debt problem (Jing, 2022). Lucas and Lo state that the 17+1 initiative had an overall insignificant impact in the region for all that it inflated expectations - it has been counterproductive for Chinese investors’ interests (Luca and Lo, 2022). Vörös contends that while China may be delaying a lot of its projects, it’s also important to note that the CEE itself doesn’t coordinate internally, the countries exist in a competitive environment, all vying for a share of the BRI’s money (Vörös, 2023).

Ukraine War in CEE with BRI

The Ukraine war brought complications in the CEE region and the EU for China. Mendez et al. maintain that the invasion of Ukraine put pressure on the EU to stop cooperation with countries seen as Putin supporters, which caused the BRI to be put under a microscope, as China has not taken an official position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which Bo also mentioned will weaken China’s relationship to Western Europe (Mendez et al., 2022; Bo, 2022).

Bo also notes that the war brought with it many uncertainties and also a prediction that many firms will continue to be discouraged from investing in the CEE region, meaning that China will need to readjust its investment structure to address this new order within the CEE region and the reputational risks associated with Chinese involvement (Bo, 2022; Yan et al., 2022). However, unlike Bo, Vörös believes that the loss of Russian markets will instead compel Western Europe to rely on Chinese markets, however, the longer the conflict continues, the more likely this will not happen (Vörös, 2023).

While the future of BRI in the 17+1 initiative countries in the aftermath of the war is still unknown, many projects have been paused indefinitely. China’s broad stance on Russia’s actions in Ukraine makes it difficult for countries to decide their next moves, with the CEE split on how to react. As the conflict progresses, countries’ stances will shift, and so will China’s decisions on how to proceed with the BRI in CEE.

Regional Impact Analysis

China’s BRI and the effects of the conflict on their engagement in the CEE can be split into three geographical regions. The first region covers countries in the potential European Union candidates, which see diminished interactions with BRI due to the EU’s growing distrust of China after its quiet stance on Russia’s actions. The second region is the countries either physically or geopolitically close to the Ukraine war. China halted many of its infrastructure projects because it was physically and geopolitically close to the conflict. The third region covers the southern part of the CEE, neither close to the conflict nor the EU, where China has increased its investments as it has become the most viable location for China to invest in infrastructure.

EU-Aligned States: Diminishing Returns on Engagement

China’s 17+1 initiative focused extensively on this region, as EU countries have a Free Trade policy, which would allow China to gain closer access to its target, the Western European market. This area has seen a lot of investment opportunities and FDI. Three geostrategically countries in this area, Greece, Hungary, and Poland, have been very profitable to China and have seen the largest share of noteworthy BRI projects. Poland has one of the most important train routes, Hungary is China’s cultural center in Europe, and Greece’s Port of Piraeus, of which China owns 51%, is connected to the Mediterranean (Usman, 2021). These countries have seen a boost in their economy and have helped expand BRI. Poland’s freight train rail is more beneficial to China regarding cargo transport, as it’s cheaper and faster than going through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2022).

Since the conflict in Ukraine began, other than in key countries in this region, investment has either slowed or stopped, and relations have worsened. Poland’s relationship with China has soured, as it has claimed that China is meddling in its affairs and trying to divide and conquer Europe, as Russia is doing in the CEE, a common theme with the countries close to the EU, who also fear that they have grown too economically dependent on China. Many countries have also closed themselves practically off, causing trade delays with air traffic and train diversions Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022). It is unclear how relations between the countries and the BRI will look, as it depends on how the conflict progresses and China’s stance on Russia’s actions.

Conflict-Adjacent States: Strategic Pause under Pressure

Many countries involved in the Ukraine war are geographically well-placed in the NELB, especially Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The Russian landmass is the most reliable route between Western markets and China, its large size and position make it a significant country for BRI infrastructure investment (Mendez et al., 2022). Alongside Russia, Ukraine is a well-placed country on the Economic Silk Road, and in 2020, BRI and Ukraine launched the Big Construction Programme to modernize roads and bridges (Mendez et al., 2022). However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put the program on hold. Ukraine and China’s relationship has also suffered from the conflict. China was Ukraine's largest trading partner in 2021, reaching $10.3 billion in trade value, which was all lost during the invasion, and for the foreseeable future (Bo, 2022).

While Russia is at the epicenter of NELB, BRI funders stopped giving loans to operations dealing directly with Russia, causing China to look for a pathway that would not rely on Russia’s territory (Mendez et al., 2022). Additionally, European sanctions on countries involved in the conflict have caused China to significantly reduce the use of its Eurasian rails, weakening China’s trade relationship with Europe (Bo, 2022). The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has made transporting goods difficult, and countries like Slovakia cannot operate cargo links anywhere near the conflict (Wnukowski, 2017). Trains were affected not only by war proximity but also because of delayed logistics, as many countries closed themselves off, with air traffic taking many diversions and costing trains a lot of time and money (Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022). One of the best examples of reducing railway use involves the China-Europe Railway Express (CERE), which passes through Russia and Belarus. This train hasn’t been affected by the conflict, but the investors of it had their risk perception increased, causing a decrease in funding to CERE and trade transportation (Yan et al., 2022).

China-based Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have publicly said that their operations in Russia are paused until further notice, but not completely suspended (Mendez et al., 2022). China is also concerned that its trains in the NELB area might be stopped at Russia’s or Belarus' border and have the cargo confiscated (Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022; Mendez et al., 2022). This caused many BRI clients to return to using sea routes, even if it would take longer and cost more (Yan et al., 2022). Until the war is resolved, Chinese investment in this area will stay on hold.

Southern CEE: Emergence of Alternative Corridors

This region of the CEE saw minimal engagement with BRI before the conflict, as it wasn’t geographically prime to connect to Western Europe, and it’s not an EU country or candidate. The Balkans especially saw little success (Bharti, 2022). ). BRI’s New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor is a route that goes through Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and transported $72 billion in 2020, which was directly affected by the war, weakening China’s relationship with those countries (Bo, 2022). When the conflict began, China had to look for alternate BRI routes, where this region came into play.

After the BRI within Russia paused, China had to look for alternate routes to Europe, where the Trans Caspian International Route came into play, going through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to get to the Caspian Sea (Mendez et al., 2022). For many countries, especially landlocked Kazakhstan, BRI became an opportunity for Kazakhstan to grow economically (Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022). Kazakhstan’s project within BRI is called the "Nurly Zhol'' program, which focuses on transportation, energy, agriculture, etc. (Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022). This program is aimed at modernizing Kazakhstan and making it a logistical hub, as the largest dry port, Khorgos, is right on its border. Kazakhstan is one of the best-located countries in this region, it sits between Europe and Asia, and its strategic location means it connects China with Europe. China is looking to expand its BRI projects into cross-border ones (Brauweiler and Yerimpasheva, 2022).

This region saw an increase in BRI investment after the war, with these countries growing their ties to China due to BRI focusing its railways and trade to the South. Even after the war is finished and previously closed trade routes open, the investment will likely continue to grow for China to have multiple entrances to Western Europe.

Policy Implications

In response to the conflict and shifting relations between China and the CEE, China requires policy recommendations to proceed. China needs to keep its long-term goals on the table, as in the future, China has opportunities to be involved in the reconstruction of countries damaged by the war (Mendez et al., 2022). As previously mentioned, China needs to keep investing outside of the 17+1 initiative and not revert back to its previous investing after the conflict is over, it should focus on building and maintaining new BRI pathways and investment opportunities.
One issue that has come up with trust between BRI and CEE countries, especially EU ones, is the fact that Chinese leaders prefer to use their own banks and companies, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank for BRI, to fund projects (Usman, 2021). China should begin investing or working alongside local banks in the countries it supports to create a more substantial basis of trust and regain lost investment opportunities. Regarding Russia, China should maintain short-term holds on Russian investment to ensure neutrality. After the war is finished, the investments mean the groundwork to continue relations between the countries still exists, especially as Russia will most likely remain a regionally influential force.

Conclusion

This paper covered how the Ukraine war affected China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries close to or in the EU left or paused BRI because of mistrust of Chinese intentions and overdependence on BRI trade. In countries close to or directly involved with the Ukraine war, China paused but didn’t end its programs, as the programs themselves were both in danger of being destroyed, and China’s geopolitical relationships with the West were on the line. Southern CEE saw increased BRI investment from China, looking for alternative routes to Western Europe. Policy recommendations for China covered being ready to rebuild infrastructure within war-stricken countries, ensuring that paused programs stay in place to begin after the conflict, and maintaining all the current and new BRI routes currently has to create more maintain all the current and new BRI routes that it currently has to create more routes into Western Europe.

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